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A PROPERTY-BASED THEORY OF SECURITY 
INTERESTS: TAKING DEBTORS' CHOICES 
SERIOUSLY 
Steven L. Harris* and Charles W. Mooney, Jr. ** 
INTRODUCTION 
I
N embarking upon the revision of what many consider the most 
successful commercial statute ever, we take as our "first princi­
ple" that Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 should facilitate the 
creation of security interests. Stated otherwise, we think the trans­
fer of an effective security interest ought to be as easy, inexpensive, 
and reliable as possible. For the most part, the current version of 
Article 9 reflects our position: The law should not impair the ability 
of debtors to secure as much or as little of their debts with as much 
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** Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The authors are Reporters for the 
Drafting Committee to Revise U.C.C. Article 9 and were Reporters for the Permanent 
Editorial Board U.C.C. Article 9 Study Committee. The views expressed in this Article are 
not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee, the Study Committee, or any of the 
sponsors of either (the Permanent Editorial Board, the American Law Institute, or the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) . We wish to thank Leigh 
Riley-Kroehmer, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Class of 1995, and Claire 
Menard, Georgetown University Law Center, Class of 1995, for their valuable research 
assistance. We also wish to thank the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics of the 
University of Virginia School of Law, the Georgetown University Law Center, the 
University of Illinois College of Law, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School for 
research support. 
We presented an earlier draft of this Article at a conference held in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, on October 15-16 ,  1993, sponsored by the Olin Program in Law and Economics of 
the University of Virginia School of Law. TI1is draft has benefited substantially from the 
commentary and discussion at thai conference, and especially from the comments of Paul 
Shupack and the input of the two designated commentators, Professors Alan Schwartz and 
James J. White. We also thank Edward Rubin, Dennis Patterson, Thomas Ulen, and 
Wil l iam Vukowich for their helpful comments. Circumstances do not permit us to respond 
here to the published commentaries of Professors Schwartz and White . See Alan 
Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2073 ( 1994); James J .  
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however, we do offer some brief observations on Professor Schwartz' commentary. We 
must defer a more fulsome response. 
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or as little of their existing and future property as they deem 
appropriate . 1  
Our position has been controversial. The nineteenth and early 
twentieth century saw many secured transactions struck down on 
the ground that they were at least potentially inj urious to 
unsecured creditors.2 A good deal of the perceived injury stemmed 
from the distributional consequences of security: property subj ect 
to a security interest would be unavailable for distribution to 
unsecured creditors . If the debtor became insolvent, allocation of 
particular property to secured creditors would unj ustly interfere 
with, and perhaps eliminate, the recovery by unsecured creditors .3  
Even the original drafters of Article 9 ,  who expressly validated 
future-advance and after-acquired property clauses, did so with 
some reluctance, apparently. experiencing a discomfort with "al l  
assets" financing that we (the authors) do not share.4 
Despite widespread familiarity with Article 9 and the passage of 
more than three decades, this discomfort persists . Contemporary 
commentators have continued the tradition of expressing diffuse 
suspicion about the "favored" treatment the law affords to security 
interests. The fact that secured creditors appear to recover a larger 
l See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) ( 1990) (providing that obligations may be secured b y  after­
acquired collateral); id. § 9-204(3) (providing that obligations secured by a security 
agreement may include future advances) .  
2 For a fascinating history of the judicial and legislative battles over the abil ity of 
secured creditors to reach property claimed by unsecured creditors ,  see 1 Grant Gilmore,  
Security Interests in  Personal Property 5-287 (1965). 
3 See, e.g. ,  Zartman v. First Nat'! Bank, 82 N.E. 127, 128-29 (N.Y. 1907) (holding an 
after-acquired property clause to be ineffective at law and refusing to give effect to the 
clause in equity against a trustee in bankruptcy because "the result would deprive the 
general creditors with superior equities so far as after-acquired property is concerned,  of 
their only chance to col lect debts"). 
4 As the official comments explain: 
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge was 
based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower 
should not be allowed to encumber all his assets present and future, and that for the 
protection not only of the borrower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets  
should be preserved. That inarticulate premise has much to recommend i t .  This 
Article decisively rejects it not on the ground that it was wrong in policy but on the 
ground that it was not effective. 
U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2. 
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portion of their claims in bankruptcy than do unsecured creditors 
has been of particular concern. 5 
Recent years also have seen the rise of scholarship that has sub­
j ected security interests to closer examination, often with the aid of 
economics, in an ongoing debate over whether secured credit is 
socially useful and, if so, how. Although the newer literature is 
considerably more rigorous than what came before, it sounds some 
familiar themes-reflecting fascination with, if not always concern 
about, the distributive effects attendant to the grant of security. 
We confess that we have shied from this debate until now.6 But as 
we begin to draft the new Article 9, we wish to draw upon this 
debate and also to weigh in with our own views on a "general the­
ory" for secured transactions. We are motivated,  in part, by our 
experiences as Reporters for the Permanent Editorial Board Arti­
cle 9 Study Committee.7 Time and again the Study Committee's  
deliberations on particular points generated both disagreement and 
confusion concerning the basic policy underpinnings of Article 9 .  
There is every reason to think that a similar fate will befall the 
D rafting Committee .  
In this Article we identify and explain a normative basis for our 
first principle of secured transactions. To establish the context, 
Part I first rebuts the popular misconception that giving security 
for debt necessarily harms a debtor's unsecured creditors . A simi­
lar notion-that the incurrence of secured debt necessarily 
increases risk for unsecured creditors-lies at the theoretical 
center of the literature constituting the recent debate about 
secured credit, which we call the "Efficiency Literature . "  Although 
this l iterature may be interesting and useful, we conclude that it is 
5 Grant Gilmore, the principal drafter of the original Article 9 and a consultant to the 
review committee, is a part of this tradition. See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase 
Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 1 5  Ga. L. 
Rev. 605, 626-28 ( 1981 ); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain,  80 
Va. L .  Rev. 1 887, 1 891 ( 1994) (arguing that "security enables secured creditors and debtors 
to extract a remedy from those who become unsecured creditors involuntarily") .  
6 Actually, we have not  shied from the debate entirely. See John 0. Honnold, Steven L. 
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr. ,  Security Interests in Personal Property 562-64 (2d ed. 
1992) ,  which offers a brief critique of Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J .  
Legal Stud. 209 ( 1989). 
7 The Study Committee's final report describes the background of the study, the 
organization and operation of the committee, and the committee's approach toward its 
work. PEB Study Comm., Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 :  Report 1-9 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
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largely free of cogent support for materially modifying the current 
legal regime for secured transactions .  We identify what appear to 
be an erroneous assumption and a methodological flaw pervading 
the Efficiency Literature; however, we have eschewed a compre­
hensive critique8 and have made no effort to demonstrate that all 
secured credit is wealth enhancing or to explain the prevailing pat­
terns of secured financing. We are confident that American law 
will continue to recognize the effectiveness of security interests, 
and we have agreed to play a role in revising that part of the legal 
regulation of security interests contained in Article 9 .  
For our purposes it is sufficient to demonstrate, as we do in Part 
I, that many secured transactions may be wealth enhancing.9 Part I 
also considers a (more or less tongue-in-cheek) amalgam of the 
views of other critics of secured transactions-a "school of 
thought" concerning debtor-creditor law that we call "Sympathetic 
Legal Studies . "  
Part II .A examines the creation of security interests as a subset 
of the law governing private property. The well-accepted rights of 
property owners-to use and freely and effectively to alienate their 
property and to be secure in their ownership-form the basis of 
our normative theory of secured transactions .  Like broader theo­
ries of property law, which generally validate the decisions of debt­
ors to transfer their property outright, our theory generally 
validates the decisions of debtors to transfer their property for col ­
lateral purposes. And like the broader theories, our theory 
respects personal autonomy and freedom of contract. In develop­
ing our theory, we seek to put to rest any general skepticism about 
the value of security interests and biases against the creation and 
effectiveness of security interests .  Alternatively, we hope to elicit 
from the skeptics a more explicit and principled critique of secur­
ity. The normative basis for security interests grounded in property 
s For the most recent such critique, see David G.  Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured 
Lending, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2179 ( 1 994) .  
9 Although the  Efficiency Literature may provide insights into certain effects of  secured 
credit, we have seen nothing there or anywhere else that would justify a major shift in 
policy. Were it clear (or even reasonably plausible) that debtors were reducing their costs 
of credit by securing some creditors and imposing the costs on unwil ling (or unwitting) 
third parties, adjustments might be warranted. In Part II.B, infra , we address how the 
revised Article 9 might deal with costs of secured credit that people generally agree are 
imposed on third parties. 
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concepts does not , of course, justify every detail and nuance of the 
legal regime. But the property analysis does account for the gen­
eral proposition that parties are entitled to allocate their resources 
among their creditors as they see fit. 
Not ali property interests are identical . Part II .B focuses on the 
peculiarities of security interests in personal property that might 
justify special legal regulation of their creation and effectiveness . 
That Section also addresses the extent to which certain important 
exceptions to the principle of free and effective alienation of prop­
erty-namely, fraudulent transfer law and requirements for public 
notice of certain nonpossessory interests-can reduce or eliminate 
any costs that secured transactions may impose upon third parties. 
The skepticism surrounding secured credit peaks when the dis­
cussion turns to bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy creates even 
more exceptions to property law principles at the margin, bank­
ruptcy nonetheless accepts nonbankruptcy property law as its base­
line . Part III explores briefly the relationship between bankruptcy 
policy and nonbankruptcy property law, in particular the nonban­
kruptcy law of secured transactions. 
I .  IN SEARCH OF A GENERAL THEORY OF SECURED 
TRANSACTIONs: EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
SYMPATHETIC LEGAL STUDIES 
A. The Efficiency Literature and the "Puzzle" of Secured Debt 
Contributors to the Efficiency Literature generally mark its 
beginning with an article written by Professors Thomas Jackson 
and Anthony Kronman in 1979 .10 Although the purpose of their 
1 0  Thomas H.  Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
A mong Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1 143 ( 1979) .  The discussion in the text that fol lows is 
indebted to the thoughtful intellectual history of the pre-1989 Efficiency Literature found 
in Paul M.  Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1067, 
1073 -83 (1989) [hereinafter Shupack, Solving]. The Efficiency Literature includes the 
fol lowing articles, in addition to those by Jackson and Kronman and Shupack: B arry E .  
Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution t o  the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 2 2  J.  Legal Stud. 73 
(1993) ;  Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes 
with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 Kan. L .  Rev. 13 ( 1 993) ;  James W. Bowers, Whither 
What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of 
Loss Distribution, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 27 (1991 ); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priori ty Puzzle, 
72 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson & Alan Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or 
Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 987 ( 1 985); Homer 
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article was "to develop a unified theory that explains several of the 
most important priority rules in Article 9 ,"11 Jackson and Kronman 
undertook their task in the context of the debtor's insolvency .  Tak­
ing the position that a theory of Article 9 priorities could be  devel­
oped only after considering several more fundamental questions, 
they asked: "Why does the law permit secured financing in the first 
place? Put differently , why does the law allow a debtor to prefer 
some creditors over others by securing their claims, instead of 
requiring al l creditors to share ratably in the debtor's estate?" 1 2  
These questions may account for what i s  at best confusion,  and at 
worst a methodological error, that runs through much of the Effi­
ciency Literature . Like many before them, Jackson and Kronman 
examined the phenomenon of secured credit in the context of its 
distributional effects , specifically, its effects on the expected return 
to the unsecured creditors of an insolvent debtor. 
As we explain further below, the well-known fact that col lateral 
enables creditors to recover more than a pro rata share of an insol­
vent debtor's estate reveals only part of the picture . Moreover, the 
assumption that the creation of security interests-or any other 
voluntary activity, for that matter-imposes costs on third parties,  
produces inefficient results ,  or otherwise is not socially optimal (or 
Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in  a 
Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 (1985); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in 
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49 ( 1982) ;  Randal C. Picker, Security 
Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 645 ( 1992);  Alan Schwartz, 
The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, 
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. Legal 
Stud. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Review] ; Schwartz, supra note 6; Robert E .  Scott, A 
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986);  Paul M. Shupack, 
Defending Purchase Money Security Interests Under Article 9 of the UCC from Professor 
Buckley, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 777 (1989); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions 
of Imperfect Information, 21 J.  Legal Stud. 225 ( 1992); James J .  White ,  Efficiency 
Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1984) . To the foregoing 
one must add the articles and commentary appearing in this Symposium. Our l ist may not 
be exhaustive; we apologize for any omissions. The list also omits finance and economics 
articles that have not appeared in legal journals. 
1 1 Jackson & Kronman, supra note 10, at  1146. 
12 Id. Jackson and Kronman went on to ask, " [E]ven assuming there i s  no principled 
objection to debtor-created preferences of this  sort, what explains the widespread use of 
secured financing, and why do some classes of creditors typically finance on a secured basi s  
and others on  an  unsecured one?" Id. 
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even useful) does not compel the conclusion that the law should 
prohibit that activity. 
Jackson and Kronman concluded that a security interest can 
reduce a secured creditor 's  cost of monitoring the debtor's  behav­
ior, thereby benefiting not only the secured creditor but also the 
debtor and other  creditors . 1 3  Unsatisfied with this explanation, 
Professor Alan Schwartz next posed what has become known as 
the "puzzle" of secured credit, setting the table for a feast of efforts 
to "explain" this common phenomenon.14  Schwartz argued that, in 
a perfect market, 15  secured creditors would charge lower interest 
rates because of the lower risks resulting from receiving collateral ,  
while the cost of unsecured credit ( i .e . ,  the risk premium that a 
debtor must pay) would rise so as to match exactly the savings 
obtained by giving collateral to the secured creditor.16 Schwartz 
reasoned that giving security in a perfect market is a zero-sum 
game. Losers offset winners , and debtors gain nothing by giving 
security .  But, as everyone would acknowledge, debtors do give 
security in the real world. Thus, the "puzzle" of secured debt 
emerged: What are the benefits of secured credit in an imperfect 
market (the real world), given that there are no benefits in a per­
fect market?17 
13 Id .  at 1 153-55.  
1 4 Schwartz, Review, supra note 1 0, at 7-9. 
15 Schwartz made the following assumptions: " [C]reditors (i) can learn of and react to 
the existence of security; (ii) can calculate risks of default reasonably precisely; (iii) are 
risk-neutral; and (iv) have homogeneous expectations respecting default probabil ities. "  ld. 
at 7. 
16 The prediction generated by Schwartz' model is similar to that made by the New York 
Court of Appeals more than eight decades ago: "If  it is understood that a corporate 
mortgage given by a manufacturing corporation may take everything except accounts and 
debts, such corporations, with a mortgage outstanding, will have to do business on a cash 
basis  or cease to do business altogether." Zartman v.  First Nat' ! Bank, 82 N.E.  127,  128 
(N.Y. 1 907) .  
1 7 For some, Schwartz' puzzle turns out to b e  a puzzle o f  unsecured debt: Why d o  some 
unsecured creditors extend credit when their risk premiums do not offset the debtor's  cost 
savings? See Adler, supra note 10, at 74 ("The puzzle is that secured credit appears 
valuable but is not ubiquitous. The solution should address this 'ubiquity puzzle'  
directly. ") ;  Shu pack, Solving, supra note 10 ,  at 1 091 (" [T]he puzzle is not one of secured 
transactions, but one of unsecured debt." ) .  
We have found another puzzle-one concerning the Efficiency Literature itself: Why 
does it dwell on personal property security alone? How does one distinguish, for these 
purposes, the mortgage on Blackacre from the security interest in an a ircraft, or in 
inventory? Schwartz originally posed his puzzle in the specific context of short-term debt, 
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B. Does Secured Credit Necessarily Transfer Wealth from 
Unsecured Creditors to Secured Creditors ? 
The distributional effect of secured credit--the reallocation of 
assets from unsecured to secured creditors-is central to Schwartz' 
puzzle and to the many efforts to solve it. Schwartz postulated that 
"unsecured creditors will charge higher interest rates because the 
pool of assets available to satisfy their claims has shrunk .  "18 To the 
extent that collateral secures antecedent debt, Schwartz is correct. 
But when new value is extended on a secured basis ,  the extension 
of secured credit does not shrink the pool of assets available for the 
satisfaction of unsecured claims. Suppose, for example, that at a 
particular time ("T0")  the debtor ("D")  has assets of $400 and 
unsecured debt of $300. The unsecured creditor ("UC") can look 
to the $400 pool of assets for satisfaction of its claim.  Next suppose 
that (also at T0) D borrows an additional $100 from another credi­
tor ("SP") ,  this time giving collateral worth $100 to secure that 
loan . 1 9  Now D has assets of $500 (the additional $100 being the 
proceeds of the loan) , $100 of which would be allocated to pay the 
secured creditor were default also to occur at T0. The sam e  $400 
asset pool that existed before the secured loan was extended 
remains available to satisfy UC's claim thereafter.  Clearly, neither 
happily explaining that long-term debt normally i s  secured by  real estate or long-lived 
industrial equipment. Schwartz, Review, supra note 10, at 4. Much of the Efficiency 
Literature does not, however, focus on that distinction. Because examples of long-term 
unsecured debt abound, we see no reason why the questions (and answers) surrounding 
the presence of both secured and unsecured credit must differ depending on whether the 
collateral consists of personal or real property. 
IS Schwartz, Review, supra note 1 0, at 7. 
19 We realize that the example may run counter to Schwartz' conclusion that, in a 
perfect market, there is  no reason to expect that D would have given collateral to secure 
the additional $100 loan. On the other hand, our example may be consistent with perfect­
market assumptions i f  it is merely one of the random cases of secured credit .  See Shupack, 
Solving, supra note 10, at 1086 (arguing that in a perfect market all creditors would act as 
one and the existence or nonexistence of security interests would be random). Regardless, 
as explained below, our example is  consistent with an assumption about the credit  markets 
that everyone acknowledges is  accurate: that credit desired by a borrower or  buyer 
commonly is available only i f  the borrower or buyer gives collateral. In refuting Schwartz' 
claim that the transfer of collateral (or anything else) for new equivalent value necessarily 
depletes the pool of assets available for satisfying unsecured claims, we have adopted this 
accurate assumption instead of relaxing the perfect-market assumptions systematically 
until identifiable elements of an imperfect market make security interests "appear." 
1994] Property-Based Theory 2029 
D's secured borrowing (nor any other transfer of D's property) for 
equivalent new value depletes the asset pool at T0.20 
The same cannot necessarily be said with respect to the asset 
pool at any given time in the future. The value of D's  assets may 
decline over time, for one or more of innumerable reasons . Equip­
ment may deteriorate or become obsolete; inventory may go out of 
fashion; a maj or customer may go out of business. If, at a future 
time ("T1" ) ,  D becomes insolvent and is liquidated (or reorga­
nized) ,  UC's recovery may be less if D gave security for the new 
$100 loan than if the new loan had been unsecured.21 For example, 
assume that the amount of D's debt remains constant at $400, but 
that at T1 D has become insolvent, and the value of its assets has 
declined from $500 to $300 (i .e . ,  the asset value at T1 equals 60o/o of 
the value at T0) . Had D incurred the new $100 debt on an 
unsecured basis, each unsecured creditor, UC and SP, would have 
recovered 75 o/o of its claim ($300 (assets) I $400 (unsecured claims) 
= 75% ) .22 But, because the new $100 debt was secured, UC will 
recover only 71 o/o of its claim, whereas SP will recover 88o/o of its 
20  Securing antecedent debt would deplete the pool of assets available for UC, of course, 
as could payment of all or a portion of unsecured debt. 
Schwartz' apparent failure to consider the increase in D's assets that results from the 
loan is consi stent with the improbable example that he offers to i llustrate the "puzzle ."  He 
assumes that "a  firm wants to borrow $200 from two risk-neutral creditors . . . .  It has $100 
in available assets and both creditors assume this value to be stable over time." Schwartz, 
Review. supra note 10, at 8. In Schwartz' example, the loan proceeds inexplicably vanish 
at or about the time that the loans are made, and the creditors are willing to extend credit 
despite their belief that the debtor is insolvent at the time of the loans and will remain 
insolvent thereafter. Professor Kripke made a similar criticism by arguing that 
contributors to the Efficiency Literature failed to take into account that security interests 
facilitate credit for the acquisition of new assets that otherwise would not be given . 
Kripke, supra note 10, at 936, 939-41 . Professors Jackson and Schwartz responded that 
Kripke confused the question of whether a debtor would acquire a new asset with the 
question of whether a debtor would do so by borrowing on a secured or unsecured basis. 
See Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 994. 
21 The statement i n  the text assumes that the grant of security itself does not affect 
either the probability of liquidation or the value of the unencumbered assets. 
22 The examples that we discuss here assume that insolvent debtors are liquidated in a 
collective proceeding, that each unsecured creditor receives a pro rata share of the debtor's 
unencumbered assets, and that the liquidation distribution constitutes UC's entire 
recovery. In reality, many insolvent debtors operate for long periods of time and continue 
to pay their unsecured credi tors; thus, those creditors may recover substantially more than 
their assumed share of an insolvent debtor's estate. 
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claim.23 UC would have recovered more if the new $100 debt had 
been incurred on an unsecured basis. The reduction in U C's  return 
is attributable to the diminution in asset values, which probably is 
independent of the grant of security. Contrary to Schwartz' asser­
tion, the grant of security did not itself deplete the asset pool. 
Of course, UC's liquidation distribution does not tell the whole 
story. What also matters to UC is the present expected value (at 
T0) of UC's claim. Holding all other variables constant, a reduc­
tion in the value of UC's recovery in a liquidation at T1 corre­
spondingly reduces the present expected value of U C's claim.24 It  
appears , then, that UC would have been better off had the new 
$100 loan been extended on an unsecured basis. 
The Efficiency Literature is replete with analyses like the forego­
ing, which compare the plight of unsecured creditors using the 
alternative assumptions of (a) an additional secured  loan and (b) 
an additional unsecured loan in the same amount. But these are 
not the alternatives that many real-world debtors face.  Experience 
tells us that, in many cases, the debtor's actual choice is between 
borrowing on a secured basis and not borrowing at all (or, in  some 
cases, borrowing less money on an unsecured basis ) .  
If  we  return to our example and make one plausible additional 
assumption-that SP would not have extended the new $100 of 
credit without collateral-then there is no basis to infer any neces­
sary reduction in the present value of UC's claim resulting from 
D's giving security to SP.25 This is so because the benefits that UC 
23 S P  will recover $60 from its collateral (assuming the assets have depreciated ratably) . 
The remaining $240 of assets wil l  be divided pro rata between SP, with an unsecured claim 
of $40, and UC, with an unsecured claim of $300: $240 (assets) I $340 (unsecured claims) = 
71 % .  UC will recover $213 (71 % of $300) , and SP wil l  recover $88 ($60 (collateral value) 
+ $28 (71 %  of $40)) .  
24 For a more formal explanation o f  the bankruptcy priority irrelevance proposition, see 
Buckley, supra note 10,  at 1397-1404. 
25 Imp licit in this assumption is another assumption, concerning the accuracy of which 
we have little doubt: the legal regime will continue to give effect to consensual security 
interests. Indeed, denying legal effectiveness to security interests altogether would set the 
stage for transactional formalism and encourage wasteful strategic behavior. Modern 
credit and financial markets implicate a vast spectrum of transfers of intangible as well as  
tangible property. Secured purchase-money financing and secured accounts and inventory 
financing scratch only the surface of the enormous variety of transactions. As Professors 
Kripke and White have pointed out, if security interests became legally ineffective, other 
mechanisms likely would emerge as  substitutes; line-drawing would become difficult and 
increasingly pervasive. See Kripke, supra note 10, at 975 -79; White, supra note 1 0, at 502-
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derives from SP's having made additional credit available to D eas­
ily could outweigh the costs arising from the additional risks cre­
ated by the transfer of collateral to SP. To see how UC might be 
better off if D borrows on a secured basis than if D does not bor­
row at all ,  let us return to our example. We saw that if SP extends 
credit of $100 and receives security, then UC's distribution upon 
D 's liquidation would be 71 °/o of its $300 claim, or $213. Assuming 
that the probability of default is 3%,26 the expected value of UC's 
claim is $297.39.27 If the new credit of $100 is not extended and the 
assets all depreciate at the same rate,  then the distribution to UC at 
T1 would be 80°/o of its $300 claim, or $240,28 and the present 
expected value of UC's claim would be $298.20.29 
The calculations do not take into account the very real possibility 
that the additional $100 loan might reduce the likelihood of D's  
insolvency. Although they indicate that UC is better off if D does 
not borrow at all, the calculations assume that the probability of 
D ' s  becoming insolvent is unaffected by the availability of addi­
tional credit. As he has done previously in writing,30 Schwartz 
acknowledged at the 1993 Olin Conference ("Charlottesville con­
ference") that the extension of additional credit might enable a 
debtor to increase its wealth. He also acknowledged that an 
increase in the debtor's wealth could reduce the probability of 
default. Using the example under discussion here, Schwartz 
observed that, in order to increase the expected monetary value of 
08; see also U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (suggesting that attempts to protect a cushion of free 
assets for unsecured creditors were not effective under pre-U.C.C. law); supra note 4 
(setting out relevant text of§ 9-204 cmt. 2) .  
Moreover, i f  security interests are suspect on distributional grounds, then involuntary 
j udicial liens a fortiori are suspect on the same grounds. That suspicion would call into 
question the propriety of permitting judicial enforcement of unsecured contract and tort 
claims in a way that gives one creditor's claim priority over that of another. 
26 We realize that it is meaningless to "estimate" the likelihood of a fictional debtor's 
failure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the default rate of debtors who give security is 
apt to be lower than the 3% rate we have chosen. 
27 The expected value of UC's claim is the sum of  the expected recovery if D does not 
become insolvent ( (0.97)  ($300) = $291 )  plus the expected recovery from a liquidation 
( (0.03) ($213) = $6.39), or $297.39. 
28 This distribution i s  calculated as follows: $240 (or 60% of original assets of $400) I 
$300 (unsecured claim) = 80% .  
29 (0.97) ($300) + (0.03) ($240) = $298.20. 
30 Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 994 ("No one denies that a debtor can use 
borrowed funds to increase its net wealth.") .  
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UC's claim, the extension of additional secured credit would need 
to reduce the default rate by more than 31% (that is , from x to less 
than 0.69x). In Schwartz ' opinion, the cases in which an extension 
of additional secured credit (credit that would not have been 
extended on an unsecured basis) would decrease the probability of 
default by more than 31  o/o are too scarce to support an argun1ent 
for the general efficiency of secured credit. 
Perhaps we are unduly timorous, but we are loath to draw any 
conclusions based on the 31 °/o figure . That figure derives from the 
particular example we have chosen, as supplemented by some 
assumptions that Schwartz introduced at the Charlottesville confer­
ence. Had we, for example, held everything constant but assumed 
that SP extended a smaller secured loan, the 3 1  °/o figure likewise 
would have decreased?1 The same consequence would have fol ­
lowed had Schwartz assumed that D 's assets decreased in value by 
more than the assumed 40°/o, or that SP's collateral decreased pro­
portionately less than the other assets. Of course ,  other modifica­
tions (such as securing SP's new loan with assets worth more than 
the amount of the loan) would cause the 31 o/o figure to increase. 
Given the divergent circumstances in which secured credit is 
extended, we doubt that any figure could be  considered 
representative. 
But even assuming that the 31% reduction is typical, there is no 
b asis for accepting Schwartz' assertion that a reduction of this mag­
nitude would occur only in rare cases. Given the assumed low 
probability of default (0.03) if no additional credit is forthcoming, 
it seems quite plausible that the extension of new credit could 
reduce the default probability by less than 0.01 ,  from 0.03 to 0.0207 
31 For example, had SP extended a new loan in the amount of $50 (rather than $ 100), 
the present expected value of UC's claim would have increased if the additional credit  had 
reduced the probability of default by more than 20% (rather than 3 1 % ) . Assume that at 
To D's assets are $450, while totai debt equals $350 ($300 to UC and $50 to SP) . At Th the 
value of D's assets declines by 40% to $270 (60% of $450). SP will recover 60% of its $50 
claim from the collateral. The remaining property will be distributed pro rata to UC and 
SP at a 75% rate ($240 (total remaining asset value) I $320 (total remaining debt)= 75 % ) .  
UC will recover $225 (or 7 5 %  o f  $300). S P  will recover $45 (that is, $ 3 0  (or 6 0 %  of $50)+ 
$15  (or 75 % of $20)) .  The present expected value of UC's claim when the probability of 
default is decreased by 20% to 0.024 is $298.20 ((0.976 x 300) + (0.024 x 225)) , which 
equals the present expected value of UC's claim had no secured credit been obtained. See 
supra note 29. 
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(i .e . ,  0.69 x 0.03). Recall that SP's loan would increase D's  (poten­
tially productive) assets by 25°/o (from $400 to $500) at T0.32 D's 
acquisition of $100 in loan proceeds that were not otherwise avail­
able could enable D to pursue new proj ects, buy additional inven­
tory or more efficient equipment, employ additional workers, or 
otherwise behave in a way that would decrease the likelihood that 
D would fail and would enhance the prospects that D would 
become more profitable.33 
Reducing the probability of default is not the only way in which 
the new credit might increase the expected value of UC's claim. 
The value will increase if D uses a portion of the loan proceeds to 
pay down its debt to UC.34 If UC is a trade creditor whose contin­
ued relationship with D enhances the value of the business, SP 
might even require that D apply the proceeds in this manner. 
Moreover, the $100 loan from SP could confer benefits on UC 
over and above the increased expected value of the claim. Sup­
pose,  for example,  that UC is a "typical" trade creditor who 
extends 30-day unsecured credit in connection with its sales of 
goods or services to D. UC seeks to make its way in the market­
place by selling at a profit, not by funding itself at one rate and re­
lending at another, higher rate. But as a "typical" secured financer 
of inventory and receivables, SP may indeed hope to earn a profit 
32 D's assets would, of course, be reduced over time by payments of principal and 
interest on SP's claim. 
33 One might be inclined to argue that a reduction of probability by even 0.01 would be 
unlikely, given a very low default rate even in the absence of new credit. The most cost­
effective means of reducing the probability of default would already have been taken. 
Once the rate is reduced to a low figure, such as the assumed 3%,  additional reductions 
would be very costly. There are two responses to this argument. First, anecdotal evidence 
shows that (i) if the default probability is not very low, it is unlikely that anyone will extend 
credit at all-even with security-and (ii) even in the face of low default probabilities, 
much credit that is extended would not be extended without security. Second, as we 
explain below, the extension of otherwise available credit can benefit UC even if the 
default probability is not reduced. 
34 For every dollar paid to UC in a nonpreferential transfer, there is a 1.0 probability of 
recovery. Thus, if D pays UC $20 at T0, the expected value of UC's claim (assuming a 0.03 
liquidation probabili ty) is ( (1 .0) ($20) + (0.97) ($280) + (0.03) (228 I 320) ($280)) ,  or 
$297.58, which compares favorably with $297.39, the expected value of UC's claim if it 
receives no payments. The liquidation recovery assumes that the $480 asset base ($500 less 
the $20 payment to UC) i s  worth only 60% of that amount ($288) at liquidation, and that 
SP is entitled to its collateral value ($60) and has an unsecured claim of $40. Total 
unsecured claims equal $320, and total unencumbered assets equal $228. 
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on the lending transaction. When the alternative is no credit at all 
for D (and fewer sales for UC) , UC may prefer strongly that D 
obtain secured credit from SP in order to keep D' s  payables cur­
rent (i . e . ,  to pay UC or buy more goods or services from UC) . 
Assuming that UC has a 10°/o profit margin, two additional trans­
actions of $300 each with D would produce profits of $60, an 
amount equal to UC's entire expected loss on its $300 unsecured 
claim if D were certain to fail. Assuming further that UC is a 
repeat player with many customers such as D, and given the 
assumed 97°/o probability that each customer will pay its debts ,  it is 
easy to see the potential benefits to UC of otherwise unavailable 
secured credit extended to its customers .35 
The benefits of credit that becomes available as a result of giving 
security also must be viewed from the broader perspective of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.36 Those benefits typically extend far 
beyond D and its creditors . Indeed, borrowed funds that D spends 
have a multiplier effect when the recipients of those funds spend or 
invest them?7 
One of the central questions that the Efficiency Literature 
addresses is whether the granting of security under current law 
promotes efficiency. To date the Efficiency Literature has not pro­
vided any consensus theory concerning the efficiency of secured 
credit; however, several contributors who followed Schwartz 
claimed a solution of sorts to the "puzzle" after having accepted i t  
35 There are many other stories that could explain how secured credit that would b e  
unavailable without a debtor's giving collateral can benefit the debtor's unsecured 
creditors. We thank Professor Shupack for sharing some of these stories for us. For 
example, if a debtor is hopelessly insolvent and has very few assets, its unsecured creditors 
have little to lose because their expected recovery is either nonexistent or tiny. An 
extension of secured credit  that enables the  debtor to pursue a potentially profitable 
project may represent the unsecured creditors' only realistic opportunity for a meaningful 
recovery on their claims. Note that in recent years government officials have been 
complaining about excessively "tight" credit policies adopted by banks, while bemoaning 
the fate of small businesses whose needs for cash are not being satisfied. 
36 As used in the Efficiency Literature, efficiency generally means the Kaldor-Hicks 
concept of efficiency: If  the losses (costs) imposed on society by a particular legal rule are 
more than offset by the gains (benefits), the rule is efficient even i f  the winners do not 
compensate the losers. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 1 3-14 (4th ed. 
1992) .  
3 7  Extensions of credit can increase the output of goods and services as wel l  as the 
supply of money. See Edwin Mansfield, Economics 273, 283 (6th ed. 1989). 
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largely on its own terms.38 Our analysis acknowledges that UC and 
other unsecured creditors are better off if their debtor incurs 
unsecured rather than secured debt (on the assumption that the 
present value of each unsecured creditor's claim in insolvency 
would be slightly larger in the former case) . Nevertheless, 
unsecured creditors can be better off if their debtor borrows on a 
secured basis than if their debtor is unable to borrow at all .39 In 
short , extension of secured credit may be a "second best" result for 
unsecured creditors.40 
We agree with those who doubt that any single explanation could 
be adequate to address the efficiency of secured transactions across 
38 See, e.g. , Buckley, supra note 10, at 1469 (arguing that security reduces screening 
costs and reduces risk but increases monitoring inefficiencies, and that a debtor's 
management is best suited to determine when giving security maximizes value); Picker, 
supra note 10,  at 678-79 (arguing that security interests eliminate duplicative monitoring of 
creditor misbehavior); Scott, supra note 10, at 931-33 (arguing that security given to 
dominant "relational" creditor results in cost savings); White, supra note 10, at 491-94 
(arguing that differences in risk aversion among creditors explain why some take security 
and some do not). 
39 This point applies equally to all unsecured creditors, whether their claims arise from a 
contract (e.g. , trade creditors who have sold goods or provided services to the debtor on 
unsecured credit) or a tort. Although the tort creditor lacks the trade creditor's power to 
choose its debtors, an increase or decrease in the debtor's wealth has a similar beneficial or 
detrimental effect on each unsecured creditor regardless of the nature of the claim. 
40 Schwartz' writings have missed this point entirely. His initial contribution to the 
Efficiency Literature observes: "A standard authority asserts that firms that pose a 
nonnegligible risk of default often 'cannot obtain credit on an unsecured basis .. . .  In 
order to make a loan,  lenders require security so as to reduce their risk of loss. ' " 
Schwartz, Review, supra note 10, at 7 n .23 (quoting James C. Van Horne, Financial 
Management and Policy 458 (4th ed. 1977))  (alteration in original) .  Schwartz rejected this 
proposition because i t  "presupposes that creditors would refuse loans rather than lend 
unsecured at h igher interest rates. The assumption is common but undefended. I ts validity 
is not relevant to the analysis about to be made, which focuses on the response of 
unsecured creditors to the existence of security." Id . Schwartz apparently believed that 
the inability of a debtor to obtain credit does not adversely affect the debtor's unsecured 
creditors. Had he believed otherwise, then the availability of credit conditioned on the 
giving of security would have been relevant to his analysis of the unsecured creditors' 
responses to the security (and the credit extension). He later acknowledged that borrowed 
funds can be used by a debtor to "increase its net wealth." Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 
10, at 994. From these two propositions Schwartz would be forced to conclude that an 
increase in a debtor's net wealth has no effect on the debtor's unsecured creditors. 
Obviously, Schwartz failed to see that a debtor's obtaining credit can affect its unsecured 
creditors and that the "validity" of the "common but undefended" assumption that credit 
sometimes is unavailable without security was (and is) central to an understanding of the 
effects of secured credit on unsecured creditors. Schwartz' spoken comments at the 
Charlottesville conference suggest that he now concedes the point. 
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the board.4 1  And we share Professor Paul Shupack 's skepticism 
that economic models will generate insights powerful enough to 
resolve important questions of public policy.42 Whether, in any 
given case, the benefits to unsecured creditors do outweigh the 
costs turns on a host of factors , some of which have been identified 
in the Efficiency Literature. Whether the benefits of secured credit 
outweigh its costs in a few, many, or most of the circumstances in 
which security interests are granted is an empirical question that 
cannot be answered with any certainty using existing information.43 
In the absence of empirical data it is also impossible to conclude 
whether giving security generally transfers wealth from unsecured 
creditors to secured creditors. Research that focuses only on credi­
tors of debtors that actually become insolvent cannot possibly 
answer the question; everyone knows that collateral provides a 
comparative advantage to the secured creditor in that situation.44 
But once one acknowledges that in the real world a substantial 
amount of credit would not be extended without collateral and that 
41  See, e.g. ,  Picker, supra note 1 0, at 650 (" [W]e would be surprised if  secured credit 
played the same role in all transactions. It almost surely does not." ) ;  Scott, supra note 10 ,  
a t  912 ("It i s  unlikely that a single explanation can  rationalize all of these various forms of  
security .") .  
4 2  See Shupack, Solving, supra note 1 0, at  1 121 -24. 
43 This point was made in Paul M. Shupack, Defining Purchase Money Collateral, 29 
Idaho L. Rev. 767 ( 1993) : 
The transfer [of security] , by itself, has no necessary economic consequences. 
Economic analysis of secured transactions reveals a risk of wealth transfer. That 
risk, and the accompanying economic costs, may, as a matter of economic fact, be 
outweighed by the benefits that  flow to debtors and creditors taken together 
resulting from having secured credit and [purchase-money security interest] credit 
available to them. The question is empirical in nature, and a proper answer requires 
information that we lack. 
ld. at 781 . 
44 Examining transactions solely in light of their expected effects in a future insolvency is  
not likely to shed light on anything other than the operation of various distributional 
principles. For example, the extension of unsecured credit also could result in  U C's 
receiving a lower distribution than if  the credit had not been extended. Using our 
assumptions, had SP extended unsecured credit, UC would have received a distribution 
equal to 75 % of its claim rather than the 80% that it would have received had the new 
credit of $100 not been extended at all . See supra text accompanying note 22. Indeed, 
whenever credit (even unsecured credit) is extended to a solvent debtor with existing 
creditors and the debtor subsequently becomes insolvent, those creditors may well be 
worse off by virtue of the new extension of credit-the assets have been dissipated and 
there is yet another mouth to feed. But these results alone tell us nothing general about 
the aggregate social benefits of credit. 
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most recipients of secured credit do not become insolvent, benefits 
of secured credit appear-benefits that accrue to unsecured credi­
tors and must be weighed against the costs imposed on those credi­
tors in the comparatively few cases of insolvency. 
Secured transactions are neutral . Like many types of transac­
tions in property (and human behavior generally) , security inter­
ests can foster both the good and the bad for debtors and third 
parties. Even if it cannot be proved that secured transactions nec­
essarily have beneficial results ,  secured transactions can and some­
tiJnes do promote efficiency and social welfare. To the extent that 
secured transactions bear a tarnished reputation from inferences 
about the general effects of secured transactions, drawn solely from 
observing the effects in insolvencies, their good name should be 
cleared. 
C. Secured Transactions and Other Transfers of 
Property Compared 
The securing of debt is similar to a vast array of other voluntary 
transactions in which a debtor may dispose of its property. This 
Section compares two other transactions-the payment of debt 
and the sale of assets-to secured loans . As we shall see, payments 
and asset sales are like secured loans in that they may impose costs 
on unsecured creditors that exceed any attendant benefits . But, 
also like secured loans, these other transactions may redound to 
the net benefit of unsecured creditors . Many of the questions 
about secured transactions that the contributors to the Efficiency 
Literature and the adherents to Sympathetic Legal Studies have 
raised also might be raised with respect to payments and asset 
sales .  Curiously, they have not been. 
Consider the payment by a solvent debtor (again, "D") of a debt 
owed to an unsecured creditor ("UC-1") ,  leaving another 
unsecured creditor ("UC-2") unpaid. Immediately after the pay­
ment (at T0) , if we hold other factors constant,  UC-2's expected 
recovery actually will increase upon D 's payment to UC-1 at T0•45 
45 Assume, for example, that D had assets of $400 and unsecured debt of $300 ($100 
owed to UC-1 and $200 owed to UC-2) at To and that by T1 D's assets have shrunk to $240 
(60% of their former value) . The aggregate d istribution to UC-1 and UC-2 would be $240. 
or 80% of their claims ($240 I $300 = 80%) .  Assuming a 0.03 probability of default, UC-2's 
expected recovery would be $ 198.80 (or (0.97) ($200) + (0.03) ($ 160)) .  
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This outcome merely recognizes that the incurrence of the debt to 
UC-1 itself exposed existing creditors (here, UC-2) to a risk of a 
lower distribution in the event of future insolvency; payment to 
UC-1 simply puts matters where they were just prior to UC-1 ' s  
extension of credit. The same result would occur if, instead of pay­
ing UC-1 ,  D secured UC-1 's claim with collateral that did not 
decline in value or declined proportionately less than the unencum­
bered assets; that is , in  this case, UC-2 would be better off i f  D 
secured UC-1 's  claim with nondepreciating collateral than if it did 
not . 
Just as a debtor's receipt of new credit may work to the advan­
tage of the debtor's existing creditors by reducing the risk of 
default, so D 's loss of the use of the assets transferred to UC-1 may 
disadvantage UC-2 by increasing the risk of default .46 Securing, 
rather than paying, UC-1 leaves the assets available for D 's use and 
seems likely to increase the risk of default to a lesser extent than 
payment would (or perhaps not at all ) .  Just as one needs addi­
tional information to determine whether UC-2 is better off if D 
pays UC-1 at T0 rather than leaves UC-1 unpaid, so one cannot 
determine whether UC-2 is better off if D secures UC-1 's claim 
rather than pays it .  Both determinations turn on facts that cannot 
be known in the abstract, including the extent to w hich any given 
transaction affects the risk of default and (in the case where D 
gives security) the extent to which UC-1 ' s  collateral declines in 
value relative to D 's unencumbered assets. 
Another useful means of considering how a payment to one 
unsecured creditor affects other unsecured creditors is to examine 
the consequences of D 's decision to pay UC-1 instead of paying 
Now assume in addition that at T0 D paid UC-1 in full ($100), leaving assets of $300 and 
debt owed to UC-2 of $200. If the remaining $300 of assets then shrink to $ 1 80 (60% of  
their former value) by T1 ,  the  distribution to  UC-2 will be  $180, or 90% of i t s  claim ($180 I 
$200 = 90% ) .  Assuming a 0.03 probabili ty of default, UC-2 's expected recovery would be  
$199.40 (or  (0.97) ($200) + (0.03) ($180))-or $0.60 more than its expected recovery had 
UC-1 not been paid. In effect, D retired the debt to UC-1 with assets that had not yet been 
devalued. Concerning the effect on UC-2 of D's payment to UC-1 when D is insolvent, see 
infra note 48. 
46 Under the facts of the example in note 45, supra, if the payment to UC-1 more than 
doubles the probability that D will default on its obligation to UC-2, then the payment 
reduces UC-2's expected recovery. For example ,  i f  the payment increases the probability 
of default from 0.03 to 0.07, then the payment reduces UC-2's expected recovery from 
$198.80 (or (0.97) ($200) + (0.03) ($160)) to $198.60 (or (0.93) ($200) + (0.07) ($180)) .  
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UC-2. By virtue of that decision, UC-1 received 100% of its claim 
at  T0, leaving UC-2 to receive only a fraction of its claim in liquida­
tion at T1 . (A similar, but less pronounced, effect would result 
from D's  decision to give security to SP for a new loan instead of 
paying or securing an existing creditor. )  The law does, of course,  
respect payments by solvent debtors to their creditors even in the 
absence of pro rata payments to other creditors. As far as we 
know, no one has suggested that fraudulent transfer law should 
reach so far as to invalidate such payments.47 
Payment of an antecedent debt by an insolvent debtor is another 
matter. Any payment at T0 clearly reduces the pool of assets avail­
able to the remaining unsecured creditors at that time and, if we 
hold constant the probability of default, thereby transfers wealth to 
the preferred creditor from the nonpreferred creditors. Giving 
security for an antecedent debt has the same effect. At T1 the 
remaining unsecured creditors will receive less than they would 
have received had the preferential transfer not been made.48 B oth 
transactions are potentially vulnerable as preferences under B ank­
ruptcy Code § 547,49 which generally does not distinguish between 
4 7  We suspect that even Professor Carlson would not equate D's payment to UC-1 
instead of UC-2 with UC-1 's theft of the property of UC-2. See David G.  Carlson, 
Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 1  
Minn. L. Rev. 207, 245-46 ( 1986) (stating that a later-in-time secured financer who 
knowingly primes an earlier-in-time unperfected secured financer is analogous to a thief). 
Even if D had been insolvent at the time it paid UC-1 ,  the transfer would be respected 
unless D intended to "hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer 
Act § 4(a) ( 1 ) ,  7 A U.L.A. 652 ( 1985) ("UFTA").  Because payment of an antecedent debt 
is a transfer for reasonably equivalent value, i t  would not be avoidable under the 
"constructive" fraud provisions of the UFTA. See UFTA §§ 3(a) ,  (b), 4(a) (2) ,  5(a), 7A 
U.L.A. 650-57 ( 1985) . However, the payment might be avoided as a preference under 
Bankruptcy Code § 547. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50. We do not mean to 
suggest here that normative support for the respect the law gives to security interests can 
be gleaned from existing fraudulent transfer law. Instead, we mention current fraudulent 
transfer law to i l lustrate the radical nature of the notion that secured transactions are 
suspect on wealth transfer grounds-an observation that casts doubt on the hypothesis 
imbedded in much of the Efficiency Literature. We offer our normative case in Part II, 
infra. 
48 Assume that D was insolvent at T0, with assets of $240 and unsecured debt of $300 
($100 owed to UC-1 and $200 owed to UC-2). As explained already, the distribution to 
UC-1  and UC-2 would be $240, or 80% of their claims ($240 I $300 == 80% ). Now assume 
that at T0 D paid UC-1 in full ($100) , leaving assets of $140 and debt owed to UC-2 of $200. 
The distribution to UC-2 would be $140, or 70% (because $ 140 I $200 == 70% ). The same 
result would obtain if at T0 D secured UC-1 's claim with property worth $ 100. 
49 1 1  U.S.C. § 547 ( 1988). 
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payments and transfers as security.50 But, because the grant of a 
security interest does not necessarily deplete the assets available 
for use by the debtor, a preferential transfer of security may well 
have a less deleterious effect on the expected recovery of other 
creditors than would a preferential payment . 
The foregoing suggests that, from the perspective of UC-2, the 
consequences of D's making a payment to UC-1 are indeterminate . 
The expected value of UC-2's recovery might increase; it might 
decrease. The same is true if D secures its debt to UC-1 : One can­
not ascertain the implications of the transaction for U C-2 a priori .  
Now consider the consequences to existing creditors (UC-1 and 
UC-2) of D's  selling an asset.5 1 Whether the expected return to 
creditors will increase or decrease depends on whether D makes 
more productive use of the cash received or of the asset sold.  The 
grant of security for a new loan is quite similar to the sale of prop­
erty; in both cases, D receives cash and parts with an asset. Of 
course, there are differences between a cash sale at T0, on one 
hand, and giving security to SP for a new loan at T0, on the other .  
One such difference arises from the possibility that at  T1 the unpaid 
and now undersecured SP may assert a deficiency claim that com­
petes with the claims of UC-1 and UC-2 against a now insolvent D. 
Holding everything else constant, the secured transaction with SP  
reduces the expected return of the other creditors . In  contrast, the 
cash seller to D is out of the picture at T1 and does not hold a 
con1peting claim in an insolvency proceeding. 
But, once again, the distributive effects in insolvency are only 
part of the story. In the cash sale D loses the use of the asset sold, 
whereas with the secured loan D normally retains the use and pos­
session of the collateral as well as the proceeds of the loan. D 's 
retention of the use, possession, and control of collateral has 
value-value that is not available if a buyer carries the collateral 
away. This additional value typically is reflected in the difference 
between the amount of the secured loan (which is the measure of 
the secured creditor's property interest in the col lateral) and the 
s o  See Bankruptcy Code § 547(b ) . 
5 1 For ease of explication, the discussion in the text focuses on the cash sale of an asset. 
The discussion applies equally to the cash purchase of an asset and to noncash sales and 
purchases; that is, it appl ies generally to the parting with an interest in property in 
exchange for an interest in other property. 
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(presumabiy greater) value of the collateral. Thus, unlike a seller, 
a debtor who grants a security interest enjoys more than the value 
represented by the cash it receives in the transaction. The debtor's 
retention of the additional value represented by the continued 
right to use , possess, and control the collateral may reduce the risk 
of default, perhaps enough to offset the reduction in  the expected 
recovery of creditors ' claims that otherwise would occur.52 
Cash payments, purchases, and sales, like secured loans , can 
result in wealth transf�rs from the unsecured creditors of a buyer 
or seller and can expose the unsecured creditors to additional risk, 
although these transactions do not necessarily do so .53 Thus, one 
cannot develop a plausible hypothesis for questioning the utility or 
equity of security interests on distributional grounds involving 
transfers of wealth, such as the reduction of the pool of assets 
remaining for unsecured creditors or the present value of remain­
ing unsecured claims, unless one also questions ,  on similar grounds, 
other transactions such as payments,  sales, and purchases .  Conse­
quently, one cannot view the creation of effective security interests 
with suspicion on those grounds unless one also questions the gen­
eral effectiveness of these transactions .54 
52 In some cases, the value attributable to the debtor's continued use, possession,  and 
control may be negative.  For example, the debtor's continued use may enable the debtor 
to stay in business longer, and thereby incur more debt and losses, when the value of the 
enterprise would be greater had operations ceased earlier. Although we suspect that such 
cases are uncommon, the point remains that, without additional information, one cannot 
determine the relative effect on unsecured creditors of an outright disposition of property 
or the use of the same property as collateral. 
53 Many creditors recognize the risks that certain transactions may present  and negotiate 
for covenants that restrict their debtors' activities. Giving security represents only one of 
many classes of transactions that could increase risks for unsecured creditors and that are 
the subject of such covenants. For example, covenants frequently restrict debtors'  right to 
borrow (whether on a secured or unsecured basis), to sell substantial portions of their 
assets, to pay dividends and make other distributions on equity, and to merge with other 
entities. See generally Committee on Devs. in Business Fin .  of the Section of Corp. ,  
Banking and B usiness Law, Am. Bar Assn . ,  Term Loan Handbook 1 62-77 (John J .  
McCann ed . ,  1983) (discussing covenants concerning mergers and consolidations, sales of 
stock of subsidiaries, maintaining subsidiaries, leasing, liens, financial condition,  
distributions and investments, and transactions with affiliates) . 
54 Jn Part III we develop the converse of this proposition: the considerations that lead to 
the general validation of payments, sales, and purchases also support making secured 
transactions effective. 
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D. ¥/hy Do Debtors Sometimes Give Security?  Is Secured 
Credit Efficient? 
The efficiency of secured credit is but one of at least three cen­
tral questions that the Efficiency Literature addresses: First, why 
do some debtors give security interests under the current legal 
regime? Second, does the granting of security under current law 
promote efficiency?55 Third, should the law facilitate ( indeed, as 
put by Jackson and Kronman, should the law "permit") secured 
transactions? Although answers to each question may inform 
answers to the others, each question raises distinct issues.56 
Answers to the first question, why some debtors actua lly give 
security, seem rather easy to us. Many borrowers can obtain the 
credit they desire only if they give collateral. Familiar examples 
are the secured purchase-money financing of commercial and resi­
dential real estate, business equipment, aircraft ,  and consumer 
goods such as automobiles, boats, and appliances .  Much non­
purchase-money financing also is made available to some borrow­
ers only on a secured basis . Working-capital loans often are 
secured by a "borrowing base" consisting of inventory and receiv­
ables;57 l ines of credit and committed credit facilities for small busi-
55 Some contributors to the Efficiency Literature appear to be offering advice to 
prospective borrowers as to when it would or would not be in their interests to give 
security. See, e .g . ,  Picker, supra note 1 0, at 677; Triantis, supra note 10 ,  at 257-58. These 
efforts appropriately could be classified in our taxonomy as raising the first question. We 
believe, however, that they probably are classified more accurately as attempts to answer 
the second question: Is secured credit efficient? 
56 Schwartz' most recent contribution is sui generis . He proposes a detailed priority 
scheme, the centerpiece of which is that the "initial financer" (which he defines as "the first 
creditor that made a substantial loan that would be outstanding for a nontrivial time 
period") ordinarily would rank first, whether secured or not. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 
247. For our brief critique of Schwartz' proposal, see Honnold et al . ,  supra note 6, at 562-
64. In our critique we suggest that the proposal depends on an erroneous assumption 
concerning the behavior of lenders (that they are not discouraged from lending by the 
knowledge that the transaction would violate the borrower's negative covenant in another 
lending contract) and an erroneous assumption concerning legal doctrine (that such a 
lender need not fear tort l iability when the debtor had already made up its mind to violate 
the covenant). Id. at 564. 
57 Honnold et al., supra note 6, at 77 ("The current j argon used to refer to transactions 
in which the lender relies heavily on the value of i ts collateral is asset based financing. In a 
typical arrangement a borrower would be required to maintain at al l  times a borrowing 
base value of inventory and qualifying (not in default) receivables that is at least equal to 
the outstanding loan balance. Normally, the borrowing base would be a percentage (say, 
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nesses typically are secured by " all assets" of the borrower.58 And 
many large extensions of credit to securities market participants 
are secured, as well.59 These illustrative patterns involve borrowers 
who desire credit and find unsecured credit unavailable at a rate 
competitive with the rate for secured credit (or unavailable alto­
gether, under the circumstances) . These borrowers perceive it to 
be in their interest to borrow, and secured borrowing represents 
their best (or only) alternative for borrowing. Consequently, they 
give security. 
Explaining why some debtors give security under current law, 
under prevailing market conditions, and in particular circum­
stances does not prove that secured credit necessarily is socially 
useful. The second question raised in the Efficiency Literature-Is 
secured credit efficient?-does implicate social welfare . Schwartz 
and other contributors to the Efficiency Literature have compared 
the impact (on a debtor's unsecured creditors) of the debtor 's 
obtaining secured credit only with the corresponding impact of the 
debtor's  obtaining unsecured credit. As a result, these commenta­
tors have puzzled over why unsecured creditors do not charge a 
risk premium that offsets the presumed reductions in risk premi­
ums resulting from giving security to the new creditor. B ut ,  as 
explained above, because many borrowers cannot obtain credit 
without giving security,60 and because the otherwise unavailable 
extension of credit to a debtor may result in benefits to the debtor 
60% )  of the book value of inventory plus a percentage (say, 75%) of the face amount of 
receivables.") .  
5 8  See Scott, supra note 10,  at 940 (finding that "seventy-eight percent of the [sample of] 
loans to firms with assets of $50,000 to $250,000 were secured") .  
59 For example, government securities dealers typically must borrow substantial sums 
during each business day in order to finance securities received by them (actually, received 
by their "clearing banks" on their behalf) during that day. These borrowings typically take 
the form of overdrafts, which are secured by the securities received as well as other 
securities. The dealers must borrow additional funds to reduce these overdraft borrowings 
at  the end of each business day. Many of these overnight borrowings are structured as 
"repos . "  See Marcia Stigum, The Repo and Reverse Markets 25-26, 57 ( 1 989) .  Although 
not denominated secured loans, repos clearly are the functional equivalent. Their legal 
characterization for private law purposes-as either outright sales and resales or de facto 
secured loans-is unclear. See, e.g. ,  Elizabeth M. Osenton, Comment, The Need for a 
Uniform Classification of Repurchase Agreements: Reconciling Investor Protection with 
Economic Reality, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 669, 678 -81 ( 1987).  
60 See supra Part I .B .  
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and its creditors (including its unsecured creditors) ,61 a potential 
solution to the puzzle appears. 
\Ve have argued that the extent to which secured transactions 
promote efficiency (or otherwise promote social welfare)  is an 
empirical question , not susceptible of a definitive answer. Cer­
tainly, one cannot answer the question by investigating only the 
effects of secured credit given to debtors who have failed. Given 
this uncertainty, we have no difficulty answering the third ques­
tion -Should the law facilitate (or permit) secured transactions?­
in the affirmative .62 In  fact , we wonder whether it is worthwhile to  
a s k  and attempt to answer this question, a t  least as  it has been 
asked in the Efficiency Literature . 
Sound methodology requires care and judgment in the selection 
of hypotheses. Is there any basis to suspect that the law should not 
facilitate secured transactions? We doubt i t .  To ask the question 
"Should the law prohibit secured transactions?"  as a heuristic pro­
cedure can lead to a fuller understanding of both the role secured 
credit plays in the contemporary economy and its specific effects 
upon unsecured creditors and debtors . Yet one gleans from some 
components of the Efficiency Literature that the inability to 
demonstrate conclusively the efficiency of secured transactions 
raises public policy concerns serious enough to call into question 
whether the law should honor and respect the creation of security 
interests .63 Can anyone take seriously the claim that the law 
should prohibit or deny effectiveness to voluntary transfers of 
property interests (or any other voluntary acts by natural or legal 
persons) solely because the efficiency of the act is unproven or 
doubtful?64 \Vould anyone take seriously the claim that the law 
should prohibit payments to creditors or sales or purchases of 
assets, the efficiency of which is indeterminate? We think not .  
6 1  See supra Part I .B.  
62 For purposes of this discussion, we assume that the faci litation and effectiveness of 
security interests under Article 9 would be coupled with the general respect afforded 
securi ty interests under the B ankruptcy Code. We address in more detail the relationship 
between security interests and bankruptcy policy in  Part III, infra. 
()3 See, e .g . ,  Jackson & Kronman, supra note 10, at 1 1 46 ("Why does the law permit 
secured fi nancing in the first place?" ) .  
6-1 In Part I I . A ,  infra, we consider the  efficiency and utility of  transferabil ity of property. 
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vVe suspect that the contributors to the Efficiency Literature 
agree with us. Although the Efficiency Literature often questions 
the efficiency of secured credit in a manner consistent with norma­
tive arguments , the literature, fairly read) attempts to provide a 
positive analysis that explains the efficiency of secured credit. No 
one has called for abolition. Nor has any contributor to the Effi­
ciency Literature suggested that Article 9 be amended to make the 
creation of effective security interests more difficult or expensive . 
E. Sympathetic Legal Studies 
We must take note of another group of sincere skeptics , whose 
concerns are more subtle but nonetheless identifiable-the adher­
ents to a persistent but until now unnamed school of legal thought 
on debtor-creditor law, which we call Sympathetic Legal Studies 
( "SLS") .65 These adherents ("Symps")  seem troubled primarily by 
the fact that secured creditors appear to recover a larger portion of 
their claims in bankruptcy than do unsecured creditors . To the 
Symps,  this seems unfair. The Symps a lso are uneasy about the 
· apparent power and influence that secured creditors may wield 
over a debtor's fortunes, both in and out of bankruptcy. The 
Symps ' sympathies lie along a clearly defined food chain. They 
place insolvent debtors who cannot satisfy their obligations at the 
top of the chain. At the bottom, the Symps place fully secured 
creditors. Then they arrange unsecured and less-secured creditors 
somewhere in the middle. 
Failing to appreciate that maintaining the status quo can be as 
profound as proposing change,  the Symps frequently lament the 
plight of debtors and unsecured creditors but rarely propose con­
crete law reforms (especially those that relate to nonbankruptcy 
law). For example, the Symps have sounded no alarms about the 
favorable treatment afforded to transferees who buy a debtor's 
assets or receive payments from debtors , an issue discussed in Part 
I .C; apparently the Symps are content to rely on the law of fraudu­
lent transfer and the prospects for avoidance of preferences in 
65 We realize that SLS is  not n ecessari ly a coherent, monoli thic, and w ell-defined 
'·school of thought ,"  and we do not cl aim that any natural person , l iving or dead, actually 
subscribes to each of the tenets that  we attribute to SLS. Rather,  we exaggero.te the views 
o f  a n  aggregation of commentators who have expressed skepticism from time to t ime.  
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bankruptcy. Nor is there a clamor for treating as fraudulent trans­
fers all non-pro-rata transfers made by solvent debtors in exchange 
for reasonably equivalent value. 
SLS, like the Efficiency Literature, does not embrace the out­
right abolition of secured transactions, which are but one species of 
transfer for reasonably equivalent value (transfers of security inter­
ests, of course, necessarily are for precisely equivalent value ) .66 As 
explained above,67 it is no surprise that no one seems to take seri­
ously the prospect that security interests actually might be abol­
ished. But, assuming that secured transactions are not outlawed,  
how do the Symps manifest their apparent dissatisfaction with the 
respect that the law generally affords secured transactions? We 
have observed Symps taking positions that may well reflect the 
wish that security interests were more difficult, more time consum­
ing, and more expensive to create, and that security interests, once 
created, were less reliable . What genuinely may concern many 
Symps about the pending revision of Article 9 is the prospect of a 
world in which slip-ups by secured creditors will be  so rare that 
debtors in bankruptcy seldom will be positioned to upset the agree­
ment of the parties by avoiding unperfected security interests. 
Reducing the opportunities to hold secured parties hostage means 
there may be less cash available for debtors to continue operating 
their businesses , pay their counsel, and make distributions to their 
unsecured creditors. On the other hand, the more difficult it is to 
figure out how to perfect or where to file ,  the more likely it is that 
slip-ups will occur. Thus the Symps' " symple" solution (although 
few Symps may be so bold as to articulate this position frankly) : 
Keep it cumbersome, encourage the slip-ups, and redistribute the 
secured creditors' property interests as the slip-ups (invariably) 
anse. 
Given that security interests will not be abolished, the Symps 
should come forward with a principled basis for casting a cloud of 
doubt or suspicion about security interests generally. If they really 
wish to argue that the creation of security interests should be more 
difficult, time consuming, expensive, and risky, then they must 
66 The statement in the text assumes a legal regime, l ike that of Article 9,  that prohibits 
strict foreclosure without the debtor's consent. 
67 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
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explain why. And if the burdens under current law are too light for 
the effective creation of secured credit, perhaps the Symps also 
should explain why other methods of exchange and wealth trans­
fer-paying, buying, and selling, for example-should not be made 
more expensive and cumbersome. As we have explained, those 
transfers also can disadvantage unsecured creditors. 
We suspect that there lies at the core of the Symps ' concerns 
about secured credit the same fundamental misconception that has 
afflicted the Efficiency Literature-the myth that secured credit 
somehow has a necessarily adverse distributional effect on 
unsecured creditors. We have shown that there is no basis for that 
hackneyed story once one realizes that much credit would not be 
extended at al l  in the absence of security . Thus, the difficulty that 
the Symps confront is the same reality that thwarts the Efficiency 
Literature. The case against secured transactions must be an 
empirical one, which cannot be grounded solely on the distribu­
tional consequences of secured credit when the debtor is insolvent. 
That case has yet to be made. 
In Part II we identify a normative anchor for the respect that the 
l aw affords the creation of security interests. While advancing our 
normative claim and rejecting the myth of adverse distributional 
consequences, however, we hasten to acknowledge that sound rea­
sons may justify the imposition of a variety of formalities, restric­
t ions , and conditions on the effectiveness of both contracts and 
transfers of property interests. Security interests, in particular, 
may possess characteristics that warrant some special legal rules. 
We examine these characteristics and a range of plausible 
responses to them in Part II .B . 
II .  SECURITY INTERESTS AS PROPERTY 
A. Free and Effective Alienability of Property and Freedom of 
Contract: A Normative Theory of Secured Transactions 
Our normative theory of security interests is grounded upon the 
normative theories that justify the institution of private property. 
The right to own private property is the bedrock of capitalism and 
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an  essential component of a market economy.68 Consider four ele­
ments of the ownership of property: 
( i )  the right to use a n  asset (usus ) ,  (ii) the right to capture benefits 
from that asset (usus fructus) ,  (ii i)  the right to cha nge i ts form and 
substance (abusus ) , and (iv) the right to transfer all  or s ome of the 
rights specified u nder ( i ) ,  ( i i) , and (ii i) to others at  a mutually 
agre ed upon price .69 
Implicit in these elements is an owner's right to exclude others 
from exercising ownership rights over the owner's property.70 
Scholars have given several accounts of the social benefits of pri­
vate property, including the promotion of economic efficiency, the 
enhancement of political freedom and liberty, the contribution to 
an owner's sense of "self," and the encouragement of innovation.7 1 
Although the desirability and general outline of a legal regime reg­
ulating the ownership of private property in a free-market econ­
omy are not particularly controversial, the details of that regulation 
may give rise to substantial disagreement. 
68 When used in i ts  broadest sense, "property" includes the general regulation of 
relations among parties and encompasses much more (e.g. , the right to vote, speak, and the 
like) than we address here. We do not use the term in such a broad sense. 
69 Svetozar Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a Theory of 
Comparative Systems 28 ( 1990) .  
70 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory o f  Property Rights, in The Econom ics o f  Legal 
Relationships: Readings in the Theory of Property Rights 29-30 (Henry G. Manne ed. ,  
1975) .  
7 1 See, e .g . ,  Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 8 ( 1962) (arguing that freedom in 
economic arrangement is "itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic 
freedom is an end in itself," and also is an "indispensable means toward the achievement o f  
political freedom");  Lawrence C.  Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in Property: 
Nomos XXII, at 1 87, 212 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds. ,  1980) ; Demsetz, 
supra note 70; J. Roland Pennock, Thoughts on the Right to Private Property, in Property: 
Nomos XXII, supra, at 171 ,  178; Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. 
Rev. 957, 992 (1982) (arguing that private property promotes political freedom by 
permitting individuals "some realm shut off from the interference of others") ;  Frederick G .  
Whelan, Property a s  Artifice: Hume and B lackstone, in Property: Nomos XXII,  supra, at 
101 . On the same subject, David Hume wrote: 
[P]ersons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted . . . .  To . . .  allow every man 
to seize by violence what he j udges to be fit for him, wou'd destroy society; and 
therefore the rules of justice seek some medium betwixt a rigid stability, and this 
changeable and uncertain adjustment. But there is no medium better than that 
obvious one, that possession and property shou'd always be stable, except when the 
proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person. 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 514 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. ,  1965) .  
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According to a well-known economic account, private property 
promotes efficiency by providing incentives for the allocation of 
property to those who place the highest value on its use .72 This  
explanation draws primarily on the interaction of the transferabil­
ity of property, the enforceability of contractual rights , and the 
profit-maximizing behavior of individuals and firms . Private prop­
erty also can promote efficiency in other ways, as by curing the 
"common pool" problem (or the "tragedy of the commons") .73 
A central feature of the economic account of property is the 
transferability-free alienability-of property rights , without 
which resources could not find their way to users who value them 
more. Nevertheless, some restrictions on alienability actually may 
promote efficiency. In her study of inalienability/4 Susan Rose­
Ackerman explained that "the familiar problems of externality 
control ( , ] . . .  imperfect information, 'prisoner's dilemmas , '  free 
rider problems, and the cost of administering alternative policies" 
each may justify appropri ate restraints on alienation.75 And some 
restraints may be warranted on normative grounds unrelated to 
economic efficiency.76 
In our legal culture the principle of freedom of contract is closely 
interrelated with private ownership and free alienation of property. 
Each concept manifests respect for the autonomy of the persons 
72 See Charles J .  Goetz, Law and Economics 52 ( 1 984); R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J .L. & Econ. 1 ( 1 960). 
73 For example, if a pasture is open to all  (because it is not owned by anyone or it is 
owned communally) , cattle herders will graze increasing numbers of  cattie without regard 
for the resulting overgrazing and destruction of the pasture. This result, an externality, 
reflects the fact that the full cost or effect of a decision is not borne by the decisionmakers. 
(Here, none of the herders has to pay anything for grazing additional cattle . )  A single 
owner of the pasture, however, can internalize the costs of overgrazing (an externality) by 
excluding others from using the pasture; using the pasture for a more profitable enterprise. 
such as growing crops; or selling or !easing the pasture. See Alan E. Friedman, The 
Economics of the Common Pool :  Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 1 8  UCLA L. 
Rev. 855 ( 197 1 ) ;  Garret Hardin,  Tragedy of the Commons, in Economic Foundations of 
Property Law 2 (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1 975) .  
7 4  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. 
L. Rev. 931 ( 1985).  
75 Id.  at 932. 
76 See David G. Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?. 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 
643 ( 1987) (disputing claim that fraudulent conveyance law is efficient while just ifying it on 
philosophical grounds) . The most significant restraints on a lienation affecting security 
interests are fraudulent transfer law and its offshoots, public notice requirements under 
both Article 9 and real estate law. We examine these familiar restraints in  Part II .B .  
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concerned.77 Yet this "freedom of contract" abstraction that so 
dominated classical contract law doubtless does not and never did 
exist in a pure form in the real world.78 Although the central attri­
bute of an enforceable contract is the right of a party to call upon 
the state 's  coercive power to provide a remedy, examples abound 
both of contracts that the courts will not enforce 79 and of chal­
lenges to the theoretical bases for contract law.80 These disagree­
ments as to why contracts are enforced and as to the costs and 
benefits and theoretical underpinnings of contract law have conse­
quences primarily at the margin. They do not call into question the 
u ltimate conclusion that the law should continue to enforce a vast 
array of contracts entered into by a wide swath of parties .  
We embrace the baseline principles that underlie current law 
insofar as it generally respects the free and effective al ienation of 
property rights and the ability of parties to enter into enforceable 
contracts. We believe that these principles reflect widely shared 
normative views that favor party autonomy concerning both prop­
erty and contract. We need not undertake,  here, a defense of these 
7 7  See,  e .g . ,  Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of  Markets: The Role o f  Contract 
and Property Law, 73 B .U.  L. Rev. 389, 393 ( 1993) (" [T)he values underlying both contract 
and property law recognize the parties' freedom, but differ in the extent and nature of that 
freedom.")  (footnote omitted). The U.C.C. generally embraces freedom of  contract. See 
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) & cmt. 2. 
78 See, e.g. ,  Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30  UCLA L. Rev. 
829, 830-47 (1983) (comparing nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century "classical contract 
law" with more recent theories of contract law); see also Betty Mensch, Freedom of 
Contract as Ideology, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 753 ( 1981)  (reviewing P.S. Atiyah, T11e Rise and Fal l  
of Freedom of Contract ( 1979)) .  
79 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (stating that court may refuse to enforce unconscionable 
contract or clause); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 ( 1979) (stating that term of 
contract may be unenforceable on grounds of public policy); see also Eric A. Posner, 
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury 
Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract 52 ( forthcoming 1 995) (on file 
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (" [U]sury laws, the unconscionability doctrine, 
and similar laws restricting freedom of contract are best understood as legal mechanisms 
for restricting the extension of credit to high-risk borrowers, particularly the poor; and . . .  
this policy is broadly consistent with the goal of maintaining a welfare system within a free 
market.") .  
s o  See,  e .g . ,  Feinman, supra note 78;  Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are 
Property and Contract Efficient? ,  8 Hofstra L. Rev. 7 1 1 ,  714 ( 1980) (arguing that the 
efficiency of private property and free contract cannot be deduced solely from an 
assumption of rational maximizing behavior). 
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principles. Instead, we accept them as sound and consider their 
implications for the law of secured transactions .81 
It  seems clear enough that security interests, under Article 9 and 
real estate law alike, are interests in property.82 The legal regime 
for security interests reflects property law functionally as well as 
doctrinally.83 We believe it follows that the law should honor the 
transfer or retention of security interests on the same normative 
grounds on which it respects the alienation of property generally.84 
8 1 We do not assert that the mere existence of concepts called "property" or "contract" 
or the fact that certain behavior typically occurs proves our normative claim. Rather, we 
base our claim on the widely shared normative support for party autonomy in these realms. 
Of course, if party autonomy principles of property and contract law were discredited or 
radically altered, then we would wish to reconsider secured transactions in that light. But 
that is another project. 
82 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1 -201 (37) (" 'Security interest' means an interest in personal 
property . . . .  "); Restatement (Third) of Property-Security (Mortgages) § 1 . 1  (Tentative 
Draft Mar. 22, 1991 )  ("A mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in real property as 
security for an obligation.") ;  see also Bankruptcy Code § 361 ("When adequate protection 
is required [by this Code] of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection 
may be provided by . . .  granting such other relief . . .  as will result in the realization by such 
entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property.") .  B ut see 
Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Functional Approach 
( forthcoming 1 994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review 
Association) .  Adopting a heuristic that they call "functional," Professors LoPucki and 
Warren scrupulously eschew any acknowledgement that security interests are property 
interests. This approach is l ikely to obscure both the doctrine imbedded in current law and 
many of the functions of security. 
83 A security interest affords the secured party an amalgam of rights that traditionally 
have constituted "property": (i) the right to possess and use the collateral (albeit on certain 
conditions and for a limited purpose), see U .C.C. § 9-503 (right to take possession); id. § 9 -
502 (right to  collect); id .  § 9 -504 (right to dispose); (ii) the right to  capture benefits from 
the collateral , see id. § 9-306 (security interest continues in proceeds); id. § 9 -502(1 ) (right 
to take control of proceeds);  (iii) the right to exclude others, including the debtor and third 
parties, from exercising certain rights with respect to the collateral, see, e.g., id. §§ 9-301 ,  
-312 (right to priority over third parties); and (iv) the right to  transfer the foregoing rights 
to others at a mutually agreed upon price, see id. § 9-405 (right to assign a security 
interest) .  These rights are not merely incidental to the security interest; they are its 
essence. 
More generally, it is fair to observe that the law of debtors and creditors is a subset of 
property law, with a handful of civil procedure thrown in the pot. Debtor-creditor law 
addresses such questions as: How does a creditor convert an intangible right to payment 
into an interest in a debtor's property? How are priorities assigned to claims and resulting 
property interests of various creditors? 
84 Professor Bowers comes close to making this point. He argues that debtors are likely 
to make optimal distributional decisions, and he criticizes Professor Schwartz for ignoring 
the "legal" and "bankruptcy" view of security devices as "property." See Bowers, supra 
note 10, at 58-60, 59 n .85. 
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B ecause security interests are property, any general theory of the 
law of secured transactions must emanate from theories of prop­
erty Iavv .  The challenges posed by the Efficiency Literature and 
SLS derive primarily from the distributive effects of secured credit 
on unsecured creditors of a debtor who has become insolvent. vVe 
explained in Part I that , insofar as any distributive effects of wealth 
transfers and any adverse effects on existing and future unsecured 
creditors are concerned, the transfer of a security interest does not 
differ fundamentally from other transfers of a property interest in 
exchange for equivalent value. Thus,  to carry the day,  those who 
question secured transactions must attack the generally applicable 
treatment of party autonomy in property and contract law or must 
explain why secured transactions differ from other transactions 
that the law respects . 85 
The legal regime's  respect for transfers of property interests is 
not premised on the belief that each owner's alienation of an inter­
est in its property necessarily and universally produces a norma­
tively desirable result. Rather, it is based in large p art on the idea 
that respecting an owner's liberty to freely alienate its property 
generally promotes social welfare .86 This is much more than a 
point about "burden of proof " in proposing law reforms, reflected 
by the maxim "If it ain' t  broke ,  don't  fix it ." To the extent that the 
existing law governing secured transactions reflects the larger,  
widely shared social values of free alienability and p arty autonomy, 
that law presumptively is sound. 
The positive value of permitting debtors to give security freely 
and effectively suggests two important rules of thumb to be fol-
s s  To make the point in a slightly different context: one who advocates the social 
benefits of credit generally but doubts that the benefits arise in the case of borrowers 
whose names begin with E, Q, and T must show why credit extended to those debtors 
differs from other credit. Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson issued a very similar 
challenge with respect to a specific aspect of secured transactions: "At the very least . . .  
those who question the usefulness of a filing requirement in the case of leases should 
explain why there should be a filing requirement in the case of secured transactions that 
are identical from the point of view of third parties. "  Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9,  35 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1 75, 189 n .46 ( 1983) .  
S6 This is not to say, of course, that the law does not or should not p lace any l imitations 
on alienation. The social costs of any particular class of alienation of a particular type of 
property in terest by or to a particular class of transferor or transferee may or may not 
outweigh the accompanying social benefits. 
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lowed in the process of revising Article 9. First, the drafters should 
purge Article 9 of obstacles to the creation of effective security 
interests.87 Because there is nothing generally unsound or suspect 
about the creation of effective security interests, formalistic 
requirernents that upset the intentions of the parties and prove to 
be traps for the unwary should be eliminated. Second, the scope of 
Article 9 should be expanded. 1vlany of the common-law rules gov­
erning the creation of security interests in personal property are 
uncertain and cumbersome. Insofar as the creation of security 
interests is easier, less costly, and more certain under Article 9 than 
under common-law rules, expansion of the statute is likely to serve 
the overarching goal of effectuating the will of the parties. The 
drafters should add limitations and restrictions only when they are 
demonstrably warranted in particular circumstances. Moreover, 
the presumption against interference with party autonomy should 
extend to existing impediments (e.g., public notice requirements) 
as well as to proposed new ones. 
B. Limitations on the Creation of Effective Security Interests 
The preceding Section argues that those who would question, on 
wealth-distribution grounds, the wisdom of generally respecting 
security interests bear a heavy burden. They must attack directly 
the respect that the law generally affords the free and effective 
alienability of property rights or (more plausibly) explain why, 
based on distributional concerns, the law should treat security 
interests differently from other transfers of property interests. No 
one has met that burden. We doubt that anyone will. 
For security interests, as with other transfers of interests in prop­
erty, the law does and should make appropriate exceptions to the 
principle that one may alienate property freely and effectively. 
This Section considers the most important exceptions: fraudulent 
transfer law and public notice requirements for nonpossessory 
security interests.88 These exceptions recognize that the creation 
87 Professors Buckley and Triantis also argue explicitly for this approach. See Buckley, 
supra note 10 ;  Triantis, supra note 10, at 226. 
ss Fraudulent transfer law and public notice (perfection) requirements turn on concern 
for other creditors and do not affect the validity of security interests between the debtor 
and the secured party. In that respect, these requirements are not so much restraints on 
al ienation itself but instead conditions to alienation that are effective against third parties. 
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and enforcement of security interests give rise to externalities other 
than potentially adverse distributional consequences for unsecured 
creditors.89 
Fraudulent transfer law and public notice requirements for non­
possessory security interests are linked historically. Many early 
efforts to create nonpossessory security interests followed the 
structure of the real estate mortgage. They were documented as a 
sale of the collateral, subject to defeasance upon discharge of the 
secured obligation.9° Creditors who obtained j udicial liens on 
property subject to a chattel mortgage challenged these transac­
tions under fraudulent transfer law. Their challenge , often success­
ful ,  was facilitated by the widely held view that the failure to 
transfer possession of goods to the buyer constituted, at a mini­
mum, a "badge of fraud."9 1  Inasmuch as the "seller" (debtor) 
under a chattel mortgage typically did not transfer possession of 
The doctrine of good faith purchase also impinges on the effectiveness of  security interests. 
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9 -307(1)  (providing that buyer in ordinary course of business takes free 
of security interest created by the buyer's seller); id. § 9-309 (providing that Article 9 does 
not limit rights of purchasers entitled to take free of adverse claims under Articles 3, 7, and 
8) .  We discuss the avoidance of certain security interests in bankruptcy in  Part III, infra. 
89 This Section also addresses briefly certain other restrictions 6n secured credit, such as 
those intended to provide protection to consumers. 
90 For example ,  the conveyancing document in Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 
1819) ,  provided that the debtor "hath bargained and sold, and by these presents doth 
bargain and sell," collateral to the secured parties, and that if the debtor does "well and 
truly pay or cause to be paid the debt aforesaid; . . .  then this present indenture and 
everything herein contained shall  cease, determine and be void." Id. at  277. 
91 The idea that the failure to transfer possession of goods upon a purported conveyance 
constitutes one of the "badges of fraud" goes back to Elizabethan England. See Twyne's 
Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B . 1601) .  Twyne construed the Statute of 
Fraudulent Conveyances, 1 3  Eliz.  ch. 5 (Eng. 1570), which invalidated conveyances made 
for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors. 
The Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances was either received into the common law or re­
enacted by most jurisdictions in the United States. Although it was but one of six badges 
of fraud present in Twyne, retention of possession after sale became sufficient in some 
j urisdictions for a court to hold as a matter of law that the sale constituted a fraud on 
creditors. See, e.g. ,  Sturtevant v. B allard, 9 Johns. 337, 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812)  ("[A] 
voluntary sale of chattels, with an agreement . . .  that the vendor may keep possession, is, 
except in special cases, and for special reasons, to be shown to, and approved of by, the 
court, fraudulent and void, as against creditors.") .  In other jurisdictions, the fact of the 
seller's retention of possession was sufficient to permit a jury to find that a fraud had 
occurred as a matter of fact. See, e.g. , Highley v .  American Exch. Nat'! B ank, 57 N.E. 436 
(I I I .  1 900). Likewise, the UFfA adopts a "fraud-in-fact" approach. See UFfA § 4(b)(2) ,  
7 A U.L.A. 653 ( 1984) (providing that among the factors that may be considered in 
determining whether a transfer is made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
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the collateral to the secured party, courts had readily available doc­
trinal support for finding that nonpossessory security interests 
could be avoided by other creditors. 
To one not schooled in the history of personal property security, 
the connection between retention of possession and fraud is not 
likely to be self-evident. Consider the observation of the Star 
Chamber in its seminal opinion in Twyne's Case :92 "Tne donor con­
tinued in possession [of the goods] and used them as his own; and 
by reason thereof he traded and trafficked with others, and 
defrauded and deceived them. "93 This notion-that the debtor's 
"ostensible ownership" of goods subject to a nonpossessory secur­
ity interest may mislead other creditors into thinking that the 
goods are unencumbered-underlies a good deal of the caselaw 
and commentary written during the first half of this century94 and 
has found favor with two prominent Article 9 scholars.95 One com­
mon explanation of and justification for the Article 9 filing system 
is as a solution to the "ostensible ownership problem. "96 Under 
this view, the publicly available information revealed in a financing 
statement dispels any mistaken belief that a competing creditor 
might have concerning the status of the debtor's  interest in the 
collateral. 
For reasons one of us has explained elsewhere,97 we think 
"ostensible ownership" per se is not a significant problem. Even if 
it was so in 1603 or 181 1 ,  when separation of ownership from pos­
session may have been so unusual as to catch third parties by sur­
prise, it is not likely to be so today, when chattel leases and 
nonpossessory security interests abound. In fact, a closer look at 
Twyne-as well as at a number of cases relying upon it for the 
creditor" is whether " the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer"). 
92 Twyne,  3 Coke at 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 809. 
93 Id. at 81a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 812-13 .  
9 4  See,  e .g., 1 Garrard Glenn,  Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § §  346-348, at  
605-07 (rev. ed.  1940) . 
95 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 85, at 178. 
96 Id.  at 183. 
97 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr. ,  The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and 
Article 9 Fil ing: A Critique of Proposals To Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 Ala. 
L. Rev. 683, 738-43 (1988) (explaining that possession does not connote ownership and 
that possession frequently is not readily observable by interested persons ( i .e . ,  is not 
"ostensible" ) ) . 
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propos1t10n that retention of possession is fraudulent because it 
creates the deceiving appearance that the seller/debtor owns unen­
cumbered goods-reveals that the pre-Article 9 courts were con­
cerned primarily with a different type of fraud: the potential for the 
transaction to be used for dishonest purposes. In Twyne i tself, the 
aggrieved creditor ( "C") did not extend credit in mistaken reliance 
upon the debtor's (Pierce's) ostensible ownershipY8 Some of the 
other badges of fraud suggest that the court simply did not believe 
that the purported conveyance-a transfer of all Pierce 's  property 
to Twyne in satisfaction of an antecedent debt-actually had taken 
place. The transfer in question occurred "pending [C's] writ" and 
was "general ,  without exception of [Pierce's] apparel ,  or any thing 
of necessity. "99 Consider the scenario: Just when one of Pierce ' s  
creditors was about to  enforce its claim, Pierce decided to  satisfy 
his debt to Twyne by conveying everything he owned, even life ' s  
necessities. And if that isn't suspicious enough, it turns out  that 
Pierce had cut a secret deal with Twyne, under which Twyne agreed 
to let Pierce use the property that Twyne purportedly had taken in 
satisfaction of his claim. In short ,  Pierce retained all the benefits of 
ownership but insulated the property from the reach of his credi­
tors . The fraud lies in the fact that the conveyance was not what i t  
purported to  be .  The purported conveyance was a sham, designed 
to prevent C from satisfying its  claim against Pierce . 100 
Just as public notice of a transaction (typically, a filed financing 
statement) has been thought to ameliorate an ostensible ownership 
problem, so public notice has been thought to reduce the likeli­
hood that the debtor and a third party will conspire to defeat the 
claims of a creditor by asserting that the third party took a security 
interest when, in fact, the third party did not. 101 Hence, common-
98 The conveyance was made pending C's writ; C would not have been entitied to a writ 
unless C already had a claim against Pierce. Regardless of whether C became a creditor 
before Pierce acquired the property in question or during Pierce's ownership, C would not 
have been deceived i nto extending credit in mistaken reliance on the state of  Pierce 's title. 
99 Twyne , 3 Coke at 8,1a ,  76 Eng. Rep. at 812-13 .  
1 00 See also Claw v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 282 (Pa. 1819) ("I  do not  suppose the 
parties [to a nonpossessory chattel mortgage) had in fact a fraudulent view, but as such a 
transaction might be turned to a dishonest use, it was their duty, as far as i n  their power, to 
secure the public against i t . " ) .  
10 1  Note: 
The fil ing made in a public office ensures the veracity of the timing and the existence 
of a security interest by e l iminating the possibi lity, which might exist under a " first-
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law and statutory rules conditioned the effectiveness of a security 
interest against third parties on the secured party's having given 
public notice of its security interest. 
For the most part, courts and commentators have not distin­
guished between "ostensible ownership" and "sham transaction" 
fraud. Because these frauds are not identical, one should not 
expect an identity in the types of public notice that would be an 
effective response to each. For example, if ostensible ownership is 
a real problem (which we doubt) , then a financing statement would 
have little value unless it enables competing creditors to disabuse 
themselves of the mistaken belief that the debtor owns property in 
its possession free and clear, that is , unless the statement could be 
found by potential searchers of the public record. This observation 
suggests that courts should exact strict compliance with the statu­
tory provisions governing the place of filing and the name of the 
debtor, and that the statute should contain stringent requirements 
for correcting the public record as operative facts change (e.g. , if 
the debtor changes its name or the collateral moves to another 
j urisdiction) . On the other hand, if the purpose of filing is to give 
credence to the assertion that the alleged secured transaction actu­
ally occurred, then there is no reason to insist on the purity of the 
public record. This "anti-sham" approach would validate a financ­
ing statement even though the financing statement could not be 
found in the public records and thus would be ineffective to cure 
any ostensible ownership problem.1 02 
Notwithstanding our skepticism concerning the "ostensible own­
ership" problem, we are inclined to favor a filing system that pro-
to-attach" rule, that a debtor and a secured party could conspire to claim that a 
security interest was created earlier than it actually was . . . .  
Notice filing does not actually evidence the creation of a security interest . . . .  
However, because the time of filing generally controls priorities, there is l ittle risk 
that collusion concerning the time of creation will affect priorities. 
Mooney, supra note 97, at 752 & n.264. 
102 For example, this "sham transaction" approach would validate a financing statement 
containing a serious typographical error in the debtor's name, such as " Looney" for 
"Mooney" or "Farris" for "Harris ." Article 9 currently rejects such an approach in favor of 
one that appears to have been fashioned with ostensible ownership in mind.  See U.C.C. 
� 9-402(8) (providing that financing statement that substantially complies with the 
statutory requirements is effective even if  it contains minor errors that are not seriously 
misleading) . 
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vides public notice of the kind that enables third parties to discover 
whether particular property may be encumbered by a security 
interest . 1 03 Our inclination derives not so much from "ostensible 
ownership" concerns (we do not think that a person who extends 
credit to a debtor somehow is entitled to rely upon the debtor's  
possession of assets as an indication that they are unencumbered) , 
but rather from the belief that the public record effectively can 
impart useful information about the potential existence of a secur­
ity interest . 1 04 Thus , we would be inclined to require that a secured 
party file a proper financing statement as a condition to achieving 
priority over those third parties who are likely to make decisions 
on the basis of the kind of information contained in the financing 
statement. On the other hand, we would question the imposition 
of a filing requirement as a condition to achieving priority over 
those third parties for whom ready access to the information is of 
insignificant value. Third parties who are unlikely to have relied 
on the information contained in a financing statement or on the 
absence of a financing statement in the public record probably will 
not be injured by the secured party's  failure to disclose publicly a 
preexisting security interest. As to those third parties ,  the failure 
to make a proper filing should not affect priorities. 
Our experiences and the considerable anecdota l  evidence of 
which we are aware lead us to think that potential secured parties 
(other than perhaps those taking purchase money security inter­
ests) generally are concerned about the state of the debtor 's  title 
when they extend secured credit and generally rely on the filing 
system to determine whether any other security interest has been 
granted in the collateral . 105 The same is true for buyers of the col­
lateral, who can be expected to give value in reliance on the 
debtor's  ability to give good title and who often verify that the they 
103 Although the text speaks in terms of a filing system, we would have no a priori 
objection to an alternative system of public notice. 
104 See Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J .  
Legal Stud. 53, 58 ( 1983); see also Mooney, supra note 97, at 749-51 (arguing that  filing 
requirement reduces costs of discovering interests in collateral) .  
1 05 This concern not only is a function of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of U.C.C. § 9-
312(5) (a) , but also is consistent  with normal rules of personal property conveyancing. 
Under those rules, the debtor would be able to convey no greater rights than it has. 
Having granted a security interest to SP-1 , any security interest that the debtor might grant 
to SP-2 would be in property subject to SP-1 's security interest. 
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will receive unencumbered property by checking the public 
records. 106 
Unsecured creditors are in a somewhat different position. 
Because tort victims do not choose their tortfeasors (at least not in 
any meaningful way) , whether a security interest is disclosed in the 
public record (or otherwise) seems irrelevant to that class of credi­
tors . 10 7  As for contract creditors, actual reliance on the state of the 
debtor's title to particular assets at the time credit is extended 
would be foolhardy. The debtor remains free to encumber all its 
assets moments after receiving the unsecured credit. 108 
To a considerable extent, current law reflects the view that buy­
ers and secured parties are "reliance" parties who part with value 
in exchange for an interest in specific property, whereas judicial 
lien creditors are "nonreliance" parties who have bargained for the 
right to enforce a judgment against whatever property the debtor 
may have on hand at the time. The law protects reliance parties by 
enabling them to acquire greater rights than their transferor has. 1 09 
In contrast, the title that nonreliance parties (including judicial lien 
creditors) acquire is typically no greater than the debtor ' s .U 0 
Insofar as the public notice system is concerned, the reliance 
concept need not be limited to circumstances under which a credi­
tor extends credit in exchange for an interest in particular property. 
106 See U.C.C.  § 2-312  (providing that seller of goods warrants good title ) .  
1 07 The public record arguably has  some relevance to tort creditors who obtain 
judgments against the debtor and seek to determine whether unencumbered property is 
available for satisfaction of the judgments. 
1 0s A creditor who wishes to bind the debtor to a covenant restricting secured debt, 
however, may obtain useful information from the public record. 
1 09 Most of the good faith purchase rules of the U .C.C., under which certain third parties 
acquire interests in property free of preexisting interests, benefit only reliance parties, such 
as buyers and secured parties, and not j udicial lien creditors. See, e.g., U . C.C.  § 2-403(1 )  
("A person with voidable title has  power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for 
value.") ;  id. § 3 -302(c) (barring person who acquires negotiable instrument by legal process 
from becoming holder in due course); see also U .C. C. § 1-201 (32), (33) (defining 
"purchaser[s]" as only those who take by voluntary transactions). 
One plausibly might question whether a secured party whose security interest extends to 
after-acquired property is really a "reliance" creditor. The answer may depend on the 
context. A secured financer of inventory and accounts generally would rely on the 
continued existence of a shifting mass of collateral to secure a series of advances, without 
advancing funds in reliance upon a particular item of inventory or a specific account. A 
secured creditor who lends against "all assets" may rely less. 
1 10 See, e.g., Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 10 N.W. 900 (Iowa 1881 ) .  
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Information concerning the state of the debtor's title to property 
may bear little relevance to the ability of an unsecured creditor to 
acquire a l ien on specific property in the future, but the informa­
tion may be relevant nevertheless to the decision whether to 
extend (or continue to extend) credit. In some industries, the fact 
that a debtor has encumbered certain assets (often accounts receiv­
able or inventory) is a signal that the debtor is in financial trouble .  
Sometimes the identity of the secured party may indicate financial 
health . 1 11 We are told that unsecured creditors , either directly or 
through trade organizations, often seek information from and react 
to the information contained in the public records in deciding 
whether to commence or continue the extension of unsecured 
credit. If this is the case, then the creditors' behavior lends support 
to a rule along the lines of U.C.C. section 9 -301 ( 1 ) (b ), which 
affords good-faith-purchase treatment to judicial l ien creditors by 
subordinating an unperfected security interest to " the  rights of a 
person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is 
perfected." 1 1 2 But if the filing system is essentially irrelevant to 
unsecured creditors, then we would support reversal of the rule so 
that, insofar as a judicial l ien creditor is concerned, an unperfected 
security interest would be treated exactly like any other interest in 
property in which the debtor also has an interest. That  is ,  a j udicial  
l ien would attach to whatever interest in property the debtor 
enj oyed and thus would be subordinate to an unperfected security 
interest. 
In a recent article, 1 13 Professor James J .  White has proposed an 
amendment to Article 9 in order to achieve just that result : namely, 
White argues for repeal of U.C.C. section 9 -30l( l ) (b ) , which sub­
ordinates unperfected security interests to the rights of lien credi­
tors . 1 1 4  He bases his argument on savings that could be achieved 
by eliminating two kinds of wasteful costs . First, some secured 
creditors would save the costs of compliance with the filing system. 
I l l  The market for secured financing is stratified to the extent that  some financers are 
known to serve primarily high-risk debtors, while others are known to serve primarily 
healthy entities. 
1 1 2  U.C.C. § 9-301 ( 1 ) (b) .  
m James J .  White, Revising Article 9 To Reduce Wasteful Litigation,  26 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 823 ( 1 993) .  
I I-+ U.C.C. § 9-301 (3) (" ' [L]ien creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a l ien on the 
property i nvolved by attachment, levy or the like .") .  
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These creditors would be willing to take their chances against com­
peting secured creditors and buyers so long as protection against 
the bankruptcy trustee would be ensured. Second, society would 
save the costs of litigation over issues of perfection. Against these 
potential savings, White explains that one must weigh the costs that 
his rule would impose on unsecured creditors who have no lien. 
He discounts the existence of "real" lien creditors as rare birds, 
while noting that unsecured creditors are the actual beneficiaries 
under current law because trustees in bankruptcy can avoid 
unperfected security interests for the benefit of unsecured credi­
tors . 1 1 5  White finds it unlikely that the costs imposed on essentially 
nonreliance unsecured creditors would outweigh the savings that 
his rule would produce. 
Resolution of this issue ultimately turns on empirical evidence 
concerning the use to which unsecured creditors do put and would 
put information concerning security interests created by their debt­
ors. This evidence, at least as of now, is available only in anecdotal 
form. 1 16 
The extent to which secured transactions actually give rise to 
ostensible ownership problems or present the opportunity for sham 
transactions has important policy implications, as does the impor-
1 1 5 See B ankruptcy Code § 544(a) (giving trustee in  bankruptcy the rights of a 
hypothetical lien creditor who has extended credit and acquired a judicial l ien at the time a 
bankruptcy case is filed) .  White surveyed 888 reported decisions concerning § 544(a) ,  
finding 343 cases that would not have been litigated were it not for the fact that U.C.C. § 9-
301(1 ) (b) subordinates unperfected security interests to the rights of a l ien creditor. White, 
supra note 1 13 ,  at 830 -31 .  
1 1 6  We suspect that additional empirical studies could provide useful information to 
those who deal with the law of debtors and creditors. Studies of debtors who have filed 
under the Bankruptcy Code tell us nothing about the effects of the Bankruptcy Code and 
nonbankruptcy law outside of bankruptcy. 
Pending resolution of the empirical question, there is arguably a plausible middle road 
that would take into account claims that some unsecured creditors do rely on the filing 
records in their extensions of credit. To offset the repeal of U.C.C. § 9-301 ( 1 ) (b),  
fraudulent transfer law could be revised to render a security interest avoidable i f  the 
secured creditor intentionally fails to attempt perfection (filing) . We would expect that 
almost all secured creditors would file under that legal regime, with the result that third 
parties ( including unsecured creditors) could rely on complete filing records almost to the 
same extent as under current law. On the other hand, this approach would avoid at least 
some costs of litigation that concern White and would eliminate some windfal l  that may 
exist under current law for nonreliance unsecured creditors. To the extent that trustees in 
bankruptcy would be encouraged to seek avoidance of unperfected security interests as 
fraudulent transfers, the savings would, of course, be reduced. 
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tance of public notice to unsecured creditors . But regardless of the 
conclusions one reaches on these issues, one is not drawn to the 
conclusion that the law should prohibit secured transactions out­
right, treat them as fraudulent in all cases, impede the creation of 
security interests, or create traps to defeat the expectations of the 
debtor and secured party. Rather, public notice, perhaps coupled 
with other low-cost devices for deterring sham transactions , 1 1 7 
seems adequate to address these fraud-related externalities . 1 1 8 If  
filing systems are not up to the task , they should be  improved. 1 1 9 If 
the drafters of the new Article 9 believe that needed improvements 
will not be forthcoming, then adjustments in the substantive rules 
of Article 9 may be warranted . 1 20 B ut we seriously doubt that the 
shortcomings of the Article 9 filing systems could j ustify the prohi­
bition of secured credit or a general policy of making the creation 
of effective security interests more difficult. 
There is, however, a third aspect to the pre-U.C.C. treatment of 
nonpossessory security interests as fraudulent transfers-one that 
public notice arguably does not address. In many cases, whether 
the alleged transaction actually occurred (in the sense that the 
debtor and putative secured party reached some agreement con­
cerning the collateral) is not the issue; rather, the issue is the true 
nature of the transaction that occurred and whether that nature is 
consistent with what the parties assert its nature to be. Consider 
Twyne .  The problem appears to be not that Pierce and Twyne con-
1 17 For example, the requirement of a signed security agreement reasonably identifying 
the collateral. See U.C.C. §§ 9-1 10,  -203(1 ) (a) .  
1 18 When one begins with the principle of free alienability of property, one sees Article 9 
not as an institution that facilitates secured credit, but rather as a collection of 
impediments to the creation of effective security interests (e.g. ,  in the fi ling rules and in the 
requirement of a signed security agreement) . Repe;:!l of Article 9 would leave secured 
transactions in the hands of fraudulent transfer law, which, presumably, would leave many 
"secret" security interests intact in the absence of fraudulent intent. See UFTA § 4(b ) (2) ,  
7 A U.L.A. 652-53 (1984) . O n  the other hand, the UFTA was promulgated in the shadow 
of current Article 9 public notice rules; in the absence of a filing requirement for 
nonpossessory security interests, fraudulent transfer law might view those arrangements 
with more skepticism. 
1 1 9  A subcommittee of the Committee on Uniform Commercia l  Code, National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has assembled experts (including 
filing officers, information technology specialists, and lawyers) who are now working 
toward improvements in the fil ing systems. 
1 20 For example, Article 9 could be revised so as to place greater burdens of accuracy 
and completeness on secured parties who give public notice. 
1 994] Property-Based Theory 2063 
cocted a story after the fact, but that the transaction itself was not 
what it purported to be. The same problem arose with respect to 
the assignment of an interest in intangibles in Benedict v. Ratner. 121 
The Supreme Court struck down as fraudulent a financing arrange­
ment under which the debtor was permitted to collect the collateral 
( accounts receivable) and use the proceeds in the ordinary course 
of business without accounting to the secured party. The fraud 
consisted of "the reservation (by the debtor] of dominion inconsis­
tent with the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien. " 122 
Affording the debtor the unrestrained right to cause the collateral 
to disappear seemed inconsistent with the concept of security 
implicit in the Court's opinion: the concept that particular property 
should be devoted to securing payment of a particular debt . 1 23 In 
other words, in Benedict as in Twyne,  the perceived inconsistency 
between what the debtor did and what the debtor said it  was doing 
led the Court to conclude that the purported financing arrange­
ment was a sham. The Court observed that " (t]he existence of the 
assignment was to be kept secret," 1 24 but we doubt that the result 
would have changed had the parties publicized the assignment . 1 25 
Public notice would not have increased the lender's dominion over 
the accounts. 
The discomfort that some critics experience with the "al l  assets" 
security interest may be related to the concerns expressed in Bene­
dict . Like the lender there, the all-assets lender arguably does not 
bargain for or rely upon the continued existence of specific assets 
(or even, in the case of inventory and accounts , the availabil ity of 
their proceeds or substitutes) . Rather, as in Twyne ,  the debtor 
enjoys the use of the collateral as if it were unencumbered; other 
creditors , however, are effectively precluded from reaching those 
assets. It is as if the secured party simply sits back until financial 
121 268 U.S. 353 (1925),  superseded by U.C.C. § 9-205 . As the Court correctly observed, 
any fraud concerning assignments of intangibles, which by their nature cannot be possessed 
or observed, could not derive from misleading appearances. Benedict, 268 U .S .  at 362-63. 
122 Benedict, 268 U.S. at 363. 
1 23 This concept is the essence of the prototypical secured transactions-the real estate 
mortgage and the pledge. 
1 24 Benedict, 268 U.S. at 360. 
1 25 See 1 Gilmore, supra note 2, at 39-47 (discussing cases holding chattel mortgages 
covering a debtor's "stock in trade" ( i .e . ,  inventory) to be fraudulent notwithstanding 
recording under chattel mortgage acts) .  
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trouble arises and then lays claim to  whatever property might be  
available at the time. An arrangement of  this kind looks more like 
a promise to afford priority in payment-a promise that the law 
does not enforce-than a lien on specific property . 1 26 Alterna­
tively stated, the secured party who gives the debtor a free hand 
appears not to have earned its place at the head of the l ine .  
This argument overlooks at least two key considerations . First ,  
the existence of easily obtained security is not inconsistent with the 
law's  general refusal to enforce a debtor's  contractual promise to 
prefer particular creditors ( i .e . ,  to pay them rather than other cred­
itors) . The disappointed obligee needs no remedy. I t  would retain 
the right to recover its unpaid claim from the debtor; the debtor's 
failure to make a preferential payment would not give rise to addi­
tional damages. And the refusal to enforce a promise to prefer 
against a competing creditor who has received the funds is fully 
consistent with general legal principles of finality of payment and 
negotiability of money. 
Second, we see nothing unfair or untoward about permitting a 
secured creditor to go to the head of the line when earlier-in-time 
creditors have not chosen to obtain security themselves and al l  
creditors have an opportunity to discover the existence of the 
secured creditor. Objections to all-assets financing fail to take into 
account that the totality of the relationship between the all-assets 
financer and the debtor may produce additional benefits to the 
debtor and its other creditors . 1 27 In addition, al l -assets secured 
creditors may rely substantially on the hard liquidation value of the 
debtor's assets even though the transaction may not be asset based 
to the same extent as a loan secured by accounts receivable or 
inventory that incorporates a "borrowing base . " 1 28 
This last aspect of the pre-U.C.C. treatment of nonpossessory 
security interests-skepticism that a purported secured transaction 
is not what the parties assert it to be-may lie at the core of the 
SLS concern that secured credit j eopardizes the existence of a 
126 Although the law will not enforce an agreement between the debtor and a particular 
creditor under which the debtor promises to afford the creditor priority in distribution, it  
wil l  enforce a subordination agreement, i .e . ,  an agreement by one creditor to subordinate 
its right to payment to that of another creditor. 
1 27 See Scott, supra note 10 .  
1 2s See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing borrowing base). 
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"cushion" of free assets available to the unsecured creditors of an 
insolvent debtor. If revisions to Article 9 make effective security 
interests even easier to create, then the cushion may disappear 
entirely .  Like throwing the switch that illuminates the Christmas 
tree at Rockefeller Center, one flick of the wrist will subordinate 
all unsecured creditors to the all-assets secured creditor. We 
addressed this concern at length in Part I .  As we explained there, 
based on the assumptions that the law will not prohibit security 
interests and that in many cases credit will be extended only if 
security is given, the effects of secured credit on the unsecured 
creditors of insolvent debtors tell us nothing conclusive about 
whether secured credit benefits or harms unsecured creditors gen­
erally. Secured credit may provide net benefits to unsecured credi­
tors and society generally, even though secured creditors take al l  
the marbles when a debtor becomes insolvent. 
Even if one perceives a need to create a pool of unencumbered 
assets, making secured credit more uncertain is an odd way to 
achieve this goal .  Suppose one can determine, for example, that 
five percent of secured claims will  be avoided, year after year.  
Why not avoid every twentieth secured claim, or five percent of 
each secured claim, thereby eliminating costly litigation about 
issues of perfection? 1 29 If secured creditors are repeat players, and 
if the perfection errors that lead to subordination under U .C.C.  
section 9 -301( 1 ) (b) and avoidance under B ankruptcy Code 
§ 544(a) are unlikely to impose costs on unsecured creditors, then a 
random approach of this kind may make more sense than the · 
somewhat random approach of current law.130 
Fraudulent transfer law and public notice requirements are not 
necessarily the only appropriate restrictions on the creation of 
effective security interests. For example, there are plausible argu­
ments for l imiting the ability of certain debtors, such as consumers, 
1 29 Professor Shupack suggested to us (perhaps as an i l lustration of the point we make in 
the text) the possibility that a bankruptcy "tax" on all  secured claims might be assessed in  
order to  pay administrative expenses and  a portion of unsecured claims. Professor 
Shupack contemplated that, in exchange for the " tax," trustees in bankruptcy (and debtors 
in possession) would cease to nitpick security interests. 
1 30 The facts that some secured creditors are not repeat players and that others take 
special care to comply with perfection requirements weigh against an approach of this 
k ind.  
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to encumber easily all of their existing and future assets 1 31 or to 
give security interests that will  be used primarily for "hostage" 
value . 1 32 And there is a host of other secured-credit-related con­
sumer protection provisions under a variety of federal and state 
laws . 1 33 Professor Lynn LoPucki would take these restrictions a 
step further in the case of a secured creditor's priority over 
unsecured creditors . He would permit a secured creditor to 
achieve priority only to the extent that the priority was within the 
unsecured creditor's "reasonable . . .  expect[ ation ] . " 1 34 But neither 
LoPucki ' s  concerns nor those that underlie the various consumer 
protection laws cast any general shadow on secured credit as an 
institution. 
1 3 1 See, e .g . ,  U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (limiting effect of after-acquired property clauses 
covering consumer goods) . 
1 32 See FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1994) (providing that taking 
a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money security interest in  household goods is an "un fair  
act or practice" under Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 ,  15  U.S .C. § 45 ( 1988)) .  
133 See, e.g. ,  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Regulation Z,  12 
C.F .R.  § 226 .18(m) (1994) (mandating disclosure of security interest i n  closed-end credit 
transaction); Unif. Consumer Credit Code §§ 3 .301-.303, 7A U.L.A.  1 16-19 ( 1 974) 
(restricting the taking of security interests and cross-collateralization). 
1 34 LoPucki, supra note 5 ,  at 1948. Although LoPucki calls only for an adj ustment i n  
priorities and during the Charlottesville conference denied any association with the Symps, 
his article is largely an attack on the institution of secured credit within the best traditions 
of SLS: "The institution of security has a . . .  bad reputation. Its most persistent image is 
that of famil ies forced from home or farm through foreclosure. Most noneconomists wish 
that things could be different. We are rooting for the underdog, which means we are 
rooting against security." Id. at 1888-89 (footnote omitted) . He adds: "Two promising 
malignant explanations for the existence of secured debt were commonly noticed but 
rarely explored. Security m ight be flourishing because it facilitates the exploitation of 
involuntary creditors or of voluntary creditors who failed to react to security ."  I d .  at 1 895.  
The analysis in  Part I, supra, indicates that whether secured credit benefits or injures 
unsecured creditors turns on specific facts. One might wish to create a regime in  which 
security interests were effective only against those unsecured creditors who could, in 
Professor LoPucki 's words, "react to security."  Id .  Toward that end, one might fashion a 
rule that subordinates security i nterests to the rights of any unsecured creditor who, upon 
investigation, is determined to be unable to react to security. A more feasible approach 
would be to subordinate security interests to certain discrete classes of creditors whose 
members are likely to be unable to react (e.g. , tort victims). For an argument against 
creating such a regime, see White, supra note * * .  A balanced consideration of tort claims 
also should take account of their adverse effects on other creditors of insolvent tortfeasors. 
An insolvent tortfeasor who incurs an obligation to a tort victim typically does not receive 
reasonably equivalent value in  exchange for the obligation. Arguably, the tortfeasor's 
obligation is avoidable under UFTA § 5(a) ,  7A U.L.A. 657 (1984) .  
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As we discussed in Part I, the questions and concerns raised by 
both the Efficiency Literature and SLS stem primarily from the dis­
tributive effects of secured credit when a debtor becomes insolvent. 
Most insolvent debtors do not become the subject of a bankruptcy 
case or other formal insolvency proceeding. Nevertheless, the rela­
tive rights of secured and unsecured creditors in bankruptcy has 
consumed thousands of law review pages. Concerns about the 
effect of bankruptcy on the effectiveness of security interests are 
not peculiar to the academy. A principal motivation for taking 
security is the desire to increase the likelihood of payment in the 
event of bankruptcy. The purposes and benefits of giving and tak­
ing security would be undermined considerably if security interests 
were not generally honored in bankruptcy. 
The discussion in Part I ,  in which we argued that secured credit 
may be beneficial not only to the secured party and debtor but also 
to unsecured creditors , takes account of the distributive rules of 
bankruptcy.  In this Part we examine two possible bases for tension 
between bankruptcy policy and a property-based normative theory 
of secured transactions that generally gives effect to security inter­
ests. First, bankruptcy policy might conflict with honoring a 
debtor's prebankruptcy transfers of property generally. Second, 
there might be something special about security interests that gives 
rise to a conflict with bankruptcy policy. We conclude that there is 
no conflict of either kind. For purposes of this discussion,  we take 
the B ankruptcy Code as our primary source of information about 
bankruptcy policy. We do not undertake to develop a normative 
theory of bankruptcy. 1 35 
135 The following sketch of the Bankruptcy Code's policies toward nonbankruptcy 
property transfers is consistent with the idea that, at least as a baseline, bankruptcy law 
should honor nonbankruptcy entitlements. Although most scholars are likely to agree with 
this general idea as a normative matter, d isagreements have arisen concerning the proper 
normative bases for deviating from this baseline. Compare Douglas G. Bai rd & Thomas 
H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: 
A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 97, 100 ( 1984) (arguing that nonbankruptcy entitlements and loss distribution rules 
should be respected in bankruptcy unless collective wealth maximization for creditors 
dictates otherwise) with Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.  Chi. L .  Rev. 775, 790-
93 (1987) (rejecting creditor wealth maximization as the sole relevant factor and arguing 
that several conflicting values should determine loss distributions in bankruptcy) .  The 
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Certainly no conflict arises between the B ankruptcy Code's  basic 
policies and either the general respect the Code affords to the 
debtor's prebankruptcy transfers of property (including security 
interests) or the corresponding respect the Code shows for the 
rights of those (including secured parties) who have property inter­
ests that do not belong to the debtor. Indeed, respect for nonban­
kruptcy property interests lies at the heart of the B ankruptcy Code. 
The Code provides that property of the estate includes " [a ] ll legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in property. " 136 It affords "ade­
quate protection" to others who have an interest in property of the 
estate (including secured creditors) 1 37 and generally requires that 
property claimants recover their property or its value before the 
conclusion of the case . 1 38 Moreover, in determining the nature and 
extent of property interests, the Bankruptcy Code generally defers 
to state (and other nonbankruptcy) law, which includes Article 
9 . 1 39 
policy arguments thus focus on the details, such as the right of an undersecured creditor to 
receive postpetition interest on the value of collateral as adequate protection from the 
automatic stay of repossession and foreclosure. See United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assocs. ,  484 U.S.  365 ( 1988) (resolving this issue, once the subject of  
confl icting opinions in the  Courts of Appeals, against the  undersecured creditors) . We do 
not trivialize these details. Some commentators , practitioners, and businesspeople believe 
strongly that the Bankruptcy Code has eviscerated secured financing, and others hold an 
equally strong belief that the Code is far too "soft" on secured claims. We do not join that 
debate but suggest that, for many of the reasons discussed in Part II ,  supra, those who 
would treat security interests d ifferently from other property interests and other 
prebankruptcy transfers must provide some principled basis for that distinction. 
1 36 Bankruptcy Code § 541 (a) ( 1 )  (emphasis added) .  
1 3 7  Bankruptcy Code § 361 (covering "adequate protection"); § 362 (d )( 1 )  (providing for 
relief from automatic stay for failure to provide adequate protection) ;  § 363( e) (prohibiting 
use, sale, or lease of property unless adequate protection is provided to entity with an  
interest in the property); § 364(d) ( 1 ) (B )  (requiring adequate protection for lienholder 
when property is subjected to equal or senior l ien pursuant to postpetition financing) . 
1 38 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (1 )  (protecting nondebtor party to unexpired 
lease of property); § 725 (regulating disposition of property in which an entity other than 
the estate has an interest) . 
1 39 Because Bankruptcy Code § 541 (a) (1 )  is part of a federal statute, the meaning of the 
phrase " legal or equitable interests of the debtor in  property" is a question of federal law. 
Nevertheless, in  construing this phrase, courts take the approach of In  re Farmers Markets, 
792 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1 986) : Bankruptcy Code § 541 (a) ( 1 )  "does not address the 
threshold questions of the existence and scope of the debtor's interest in a given asset. 
Under both the [Bankruptcy] Act [of 1898] and the [1978 Bankruptcy] Code, we resolve 
these questions by reference to nonbankruptcy law. " Id. at 1402 (citations omitted). 
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We see nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that suggests any ani­
mus toward prebankruptcy transfers generally. And, although the 
B ankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes and makes provision for 
secured claims, 1 40 for the most part i t  does not s ingle out secured 
transactions . For example,  the rules concerning adequate protec­
tion are , at least by their terms, agnostic as to the kind of property 
interest that is involved.  The same is true for the maj or avoidance 
powers . 1 4 1  To a considerable extent, the avoidance powers build 
upon nonbankruptcy law. 1 42 One principal exception is the bank­
ruptcy trustee 's power to avoid certain preferential prebankruptcy 
transfers that would be wholly effective and unobjectionable under 
state law . 1 43 But the avoidance of preferences applies to all  forms 
of transfer, including payments; it does not discriminate against 
security interests . 1 44 
140 B ankruptcy Code § 506. 
1 4 1 See, e.g. ,  Bankruptcy Code §§ 544, 547, 548. 
1 42 For example, Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) defers completely to applicable 
non bankruptcy law for the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor, as does § 544(b) for the 
avoidance powers of an actual creditor. Although § 548 has been held to create a federal 
law of fraudulent transfer for bankruptcy purposes, its principles are consistent with those 
of state law. Compare Bankruptcy Code § 548(a ) ( 1 )  (actual fraud) and § 548(a) (2) 
(constructive fraud) with Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 ( 1918) 
(actual fraud) and §§  4-6, 7 A U.L.A. 504-07 (1918) (constructive fraud) and UFTA 
§ 4(a) ( 1 ) ,  7 A U.L.A. 652 (1984) (actual fraud) and §§  4(a) (2) , 5 (a) ,  7 A U.L.A. 653. 657 
( 1984) (constructive fraud). 
1 43 See Bankruptcy Code § 547. The two most commonly proffered explanations of 
preference law relate to distributional concerns (i .e. ,  that preference law promotes equality 
of treatment among creditors) and to wealth maximization (i .e . ,  that it deters creditors 
from diminishing the going-concern value of the debtor by stripping away assets) .  See, 
e.g. ,  John C. McCoid , II ,  Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of 
Doubt, 67 Va. L. Rev. 249, 260-61 (1981). Although McCoid refers to maximization of the 
debtor's estate as "an infrequently stated companion goal ," id .  at 261 , more recent 
scholarship has emphasized this goal more than equality of distribution. See Steven L. 
H arris, Deterrence, Equality and Preferences: A Challenge to Current Theories 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) .  One of us 
has suggested elsewhere that the treatment of security interests under B ankruptcy Code 
§ 547 appears more concerned with blunting the advantage that particular creditors might 
otherwise enjoy than with preventing wealth-destroying "last-minute grabs" by secured 
parties. Id. at 33. 
144 If anything, certain exceptions to avoidance are deferential to the transfer of security 
interests. See Bankruptcy Code § 547(c) (3) (excepting from avoidance certain purchase­
money security interests); § 547( c) (5) (excepting from avoidance certain secu;ity interests 
in inventory, receivables, and the proceeds of either) .  
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Say what one will about whether the drafters of Article 9 facili­
tated the creation of secured credit more than they could have 
imagined. But the B ankruptcy Code was drafted in the shadow of 
Article 9 ,  with Article 9 's  explicit rejection of the rule of Benedict 
v. Ratner 145 and explicit validation of after-acquired property 
clauses . 1 46 By the mid-1970s the practical implications of Article 9 
were clear: a multitude of borrowers and lenders had entered into 
Article 9 transactions, including loans secured by all assets of the 
borrower. Congress clearly left the door open for secured creditors 
to take everything in bankruptcy .  
Nothing in  the B ankruptcy Code instructs the drafters of the new 
Article 9 to make secured credit less available, more expensive , or 
more risky. But SLS would do just that .  In their preoccupation 
with the putative impact of secured claims on the cushion of "free"  
assets (or the absence thereof) available for unsecured creditors, 
the Symps identify a dark side to secured credit. 1 47 We submit that 
unsecured creditors of insolvent debtors go unpaid in bankruptcy 
because their debtors have gone broke. To blame their plight on 
secured credit makes no more sense than to  blame insolvencies on  
tort victims who buy defective products o r  on  the public generally 
for not buying enough of a debtor's product at a high enough price 
to enable the debtor to turn a profit . 1 48 As we explained else­
where, 149 even if secured creditors were to take everything in every 
insolvency, that would tell us nothing about whether secured credit 
is beneficial to unsecured creditors or society generally. The 
Symps' claim that " everyone must share the pain" when the debtor 
145 u.c.c. § 9-205 . 
1 46 I d. § 9 -204(1  ) .  
147 There are other related, but distinct, approaches. One suggests that bankruptcy is a 
common disaster in which all  creditors must share to a greater or lesser extent. See, e .g . ,  
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E .  Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on 
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155 ( 1 989) ; cf. United Sav .  
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. ,  484 U.S .  365, 378-79 (rejecting the argument 
that, under the Bankruptcy Code, "secured creditors do not bear the costs of  
reorganization") .  The other approach emphasizes the desirabil ity of reducing in 
bankruptcy any nonbankruptcy advantage that one creditor may enj oy over another. See 
Harris, supra note 143, at  29-38. 
1 48 Secured parties who are in  fact blameworthy-those who have engaged in 
inequitable conduct that injures other creditors-may find their claims s ubordinated under 
principles of equitable subordination. See Bankruptcy Code § 510(c).  
149 See supra Part I .B .  
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enters bankruptcy is not a sound basis for an indictment of secured 
credit or a justification for generally redistributing the property of 
secured creditors to others . Even if bankruptcy law were to adopt 
that unsubstantiated claim, the claim still would need to be opera­
tionalized in a principled manner-something the Symps have not 
even attempted to do. Doing so would require them to take 
account of how making security interests less valuable in bank­
ruptcy would reduce the availability of secured credit, to the detri­
ment of the very unsecured creditors that the Symps think they are 
helping. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
We respect the efforts that have produced the Efficiency Litera­
ture, and we appreciate the Symps' instinctive desire for equitable 
allocation of the social burdens of insolvency. In this Article ,  how­
ever, we have tried to explore the connection, if any there be, 
between the prevailing academic agendas and the world of law 
reform. The facts , as they appear to us, are these. Article 9 will be 
revised within the next three years. Over the last  fifteen years the 
Efficiency Literature has produced few proposals for changes in 
the law.150 Its principal message has been to advocate the status 
quo, based on perceived benefits of secured credit or uncertainty 
sufficient to discourage tampering with a well-settled legal institu­
tion. SLS appears not to have been influenced materially by the 
Efficiency Literature (if anything, Symps may take heart at the 
indeterminacy highlighted in the Efficiency Literature) . Although 
the shadow cast by SLS over the institution of secured credit is 
ubiquitous, SLS has come forward with no coherent and principled 
basis on which to question the benefits of secured credit. And both 
the Efficiency Literature and SLS have been led astray by the myth 
that secured credit necessarily has adverse effects on unsecured 
creditors. 
In taking issue with a number of our material points and with 
our conclusions, Professor Schwartz asserts that we have "fail[  ed] 
150 There are exceptions. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 10, at 1460-69 (questioning 
superpriority for purchase-money security interests and priority for holders in due course 
of negotiable instruments); Schwartz, supra note 6 (proposing reforms to the Article 9 and 
bankruptcy priority schemes). 
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to take the analysis of security seriously. " 1 5 1  l\!Iost readers easily 
\vill see that by this phrase Schwartz means that we have failed to 
approach his "puzzle" of secured credit on his terms and in the 
manner he and some other contributors to the Efficiency Litera­
ture previously have chosen to address the subj ect. Instead, we 
have based our analysis on two assumptions that we do not believe 
can be seriously questioned: that something like security interests 
will continue to be an important feature of our legal landscape ,  and 
that much credit would not be extended without security. Given 
these assumptions, we have explored whether the extension of 
secured credit to a debtor necessarily is harmful to the debtor's 
unsecured creditors , as some (including Schwartz) have 
assumed. 1 52 Professor Schwartz ' critique fails to shake our conclu­
sions . To the contrary, we are gratified that Schwartz apparently 
has conceded that the question is an empirical one. 153 
We see secured transactions as a subset of property law and 
secured credit as one species of exchange for value . Our view not 
only draws normative support from the widely accepted respect 
that the law affords party autonomy, but also exposes the incoher­
ence of SLS .  Perhaps our view can provide a useful baseline for 
the drafters of the new Article 9. At a minimum, we hope that it 
stimulates discussion. 
1 5 1  Schwartz, supra note **, at 2086. 
1 52 Most of Professor Schwartz' errors derive from his failure to take seriously or 
understand these assumptions. Two examples will suffice. Schwartz chides u s  for not 
making progress with his puzzle, id. at 2080, but we have declared our i ntention not to 
address his puzzle on his terms, see, e.g., supra note 19. Professor Schwartz also claims that 
we have ignored certain factors, such as information asymmetry and market imperfections, 
that bear on the debate. Of course, we do consider these issues in Part II .B, supra. These 
factors generally are addressed by the current regime through public notice rules, 
fraudulent transfer law, and the like. Once they have been dealt with, there are no  
relevant fundamental distinctions between secured transactions and  other voluntary 
transactions, as we have shown. 
153 His claim to have answered the question conclusively with his "armchair 
empiricism," however, is far-fetched. See Schwartz, supra note * * ,  at 2078.  Schwartz is 
correct in attempting to distinguish fact from theory, but i f  he is wrong on his empirical 
point he has little theory left with which to work. 
